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THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT & DOE v UNOCAL. A
PAQUETE HABANA APPROACH TO THE RESCUE
JOHN HABERSTROH
The requirement that a rule command the general assent of civilized nations to
become binding upon them all is a stringent one. Were this not so, the courts of
one nation might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the
name of applying internationallaw.I
The exalted power of administeringjudicially the law of nations
What a
beautiful and magnificentprospect of government is now opened
The sluices
of discord, devastation,
2 and war are shut: those of harmony, improvement, and
happiness are opened.
I. INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago Judge Edwards made his now well-known plea for the
Supreme Court to clarify the Alien Tort Claims Act" (ATCA) 3 and the law of
nations. 4 His plea echoes through a series of recent Ninth Circuit alien tort claim

John Haberstroh is a 2003 graduate of the State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law,
with a certificate of specialization in international law. He thanks for all their help and tough love the
expert faculty at Buffalo Law, in particular James Atleson, Guyora Binder, Elizabeth Mensch, and
Makau Mutua.
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. 677 694 (1900)).
2. 1 JAMES WILSON, Of Man, as Member of the Great Commonwealth of Nations, in THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 282 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967), quoted in Douglas J. Sylvester,

InternationalLaw As Sword Or Shield? Early American Foreign Policy and the Law Of Nations, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 60 (1999); See also William R. Casio, The Federal Courts Protective
Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV 467, 505
(1986).
3. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2004). ATCA is not an "Act" Alien Tort Statute is a more accurate
but less widely used designation. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, UniversalJurisdiction and U.S. Law,
2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F 323, 342 (2001) (discussing the Alien Tort Statute). Others would prefer the
statute be called the Alien Tort Clause, since it was in fact a clause in Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of

1789. William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of The Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the
"Orignalists 19 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV. 221,222 n.6 (1996) [hereinafter Dodge I].
4. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) ("This case deals with an area of the law that cnes out for clarification by the Supreme
Court. We confront at every turn broad and novel questions about the definition and application of the
'law of nations."'). Judge Robb disagreed in the same per curiam decision:
When case presents broad and novel questions of this sort, courts ought not to appeal
for guidance to the Supreme Court, but should instead look to Congress and the
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decisions here labeled Unocal I, II, and 111.5 The litigation concerns Unocal's
alleged complicity in Burmese security forces' use of forced labor to construct oil
and gas pipeline facilities. Unocal III is a vacated appellate court decision,
recently reheard en banc. 6 A final Ninth Circuit decision was expected7 in the Fall
of 2003, but a decision had not yet been issued by the following spring.
A reheanng decision that largely affirms the appellate court may compel
Supreme Court review, and then we may have the long overdue update of judicial
rules for determining customary international law.8 This in turn would clarify
which international human rights violations, and which behavior in complicity
with those violations, fall within the scope of ATCA. 9
The Ninth Circuit en banc oral arguments took place on June 17 2003. As
expected, the judges' main interest was whether the appellate court was correct in
submitting Unocal's actions to an aiding-and-abetting standard derived from ad

President. Should these branches of the Government decide that questions of this sort
are proper subjects for judicial inquiry, they can then provide the courts with the
guidelines by which such inquiries should proceed.
Id.at 827 (Robb, J.,
concurring). The terms "customary international law" and "the law of nations" are
treated here as equivalent. See Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714 (9th Cir. 1992)
("[Clustomary international law [is] the direct descendant of the law of nations."); Doe I v. Islamic
Salvation Front, 993 F Supp. 3, 7 (D. D.C. 1998) ("The law of nations [is] currently known as
international customary law.").
5. Doe v. Unocal Corp. 963 F Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) [hereinafter Unocal ]; Doe v. Unocal
Corp. I 10 F Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [hereinafter Unocal11]; and Doe v. Unocal Corp, Nos. 0056603, 00-57197, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Unocal III].
6. Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Feb.
14, 2003) (en banc hearing order). See also Jason Hoppin, 9th Circuit Wrestles With A TCA Standards,
THE RECORDER, June 18, 2003, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/newswire article.
jspid=1055463665626 (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). An unofficial transcript of the en banc hearing is
provided by one of the non-government organizations (NGOs) assisting the plaintiffs, Earthnghts
International. See http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/enbanctranscript.doc (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
For further information on the NGOs assisting the plaintiffs, see infra note 22 and accompanying text.
7 See Harold H. Koh, Wrong on Rights, YALE GLOBAL ONLINE, July 18, 2003, at
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=2121 (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
8. "Customary international law [is the law of the international community] that results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) (1987); cf.
Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art.
38(1)(b), 59 Stat. 1031, 1060, 1945 U.S.T LEXIS 199, 63 (stating that the Court shall apply
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law").
9. For this reason, the now seven years of litigation have been closely watched by allies of
international corporations and human rights advocates. See Marcia Coyle, 9th Circuit Spurns U.S. Over
Alien Tort Claims, NAT'L L. J., June 10, 2003, available at http://www.law.com/serviet/ContentServer?
pagename--OpenMarket/XceleratefView&c=LawArticle&cid=I 052440857507&t=LawArticle
(last
visited Mar. 10, 2004) (writing that Doe v. Unocal is "viewed as pivotal by human rights and corporate
defense lawyers in the fight over ATCA."); Jenna Greene, Gathering Storm, LEGAL TIMES, July 23,
2003, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/newswire-article.jsp?id=105841640691 1 (last visited Mar.
10, 2004) (Greene writes that the case is closely watched. Regarding ATCA, she states that "[blusiness
advocates nationwide are sounding the alarm about the once-obscure 1789 statute
with "[giround
zero in the fight
Doe v. Unocal." She adds that "[Ilabor and human rights activists, religious
groups, environmental organizations and plaintiffs' lawyers are mobilized to defend the statute
").
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hoc international criminal tribunal decisions.10 The judges indicated they were
considering the Unocal III concurrence, which had suggested instead applying a
federal civil common law standard to the aid-and-abet claims. 1
However, by presenting itself with only those two choices, the appellate court
displayed the unpalatable alternatives U.S. courts normally provide themselves
with in making customary international law determinations. A third and better
alternative is to institute a judicial practice - in a substantive international law
matter such as the applicable aiding-and-abetting standard - of freshly determining
such standards from the consensus among the world's domestic legal systems.
This might be called a "Paquete Habana" approach, though it is a natural
extension of Habana in line with the increased scope and domestic penetration of
international law. Critically such an approach would continue to recognize the
consensual nature of customary international law- that it must derive from settled
practice among the nations of the world. As applied to Unocal's aiding and
abetting conduct - which would not generate civil or criminal liability in the vast
majority of the world's legal systems - the approach would not find the
corporation's misbehavior a law of nations tort, and would compel dismissal of the
action because ATCA subsumes only torts in violation of customary international

law.
ATCA itself may receive a fresh review if the Supreme Court considers
Unocal III. Concerned by a statute unbound by a "new" customary international
law, the Court may seek to dim the statute's usefulness in international human
rights litigation. 12 The Court may even align itself with the scholarship of Judge
Robert Bork and others who have long advocated limiting ATCA to law of nations
torts actionable in the 1790s or to torts taking place in the United States.' 3 Instead,

10. Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir. Feb.
14, 2003) (en bane hearing order).
11. Id.
12. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in the U.S. Courts- Before
and After Erie, 26 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 807, 822 (1997) (A critic of the new customary
international law, Bradley states that it "differs from traditional customary international law in several
fundamental ways: it can arise much more quickly; it is based less on actual state practice and more on
international pronouncements, such as UN General Assembly resolutions and multilateral treaties; and,
perhaps most importantly, it purports to regulate not the relations of states among themselves, but rather
a state's treatment of its own citizens."); see also J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary
International Law, 40 VA. J.INT'L L. 449, 536 (2000) (concluding that customary international law
lacks the four indicators of legitimacy: determinacy, symbolic validation, coherence, and adherence to
hierarchy of secondary rules); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance
Between Modern and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 666-68 (2000);
Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State "Sovereignty 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMp L. 31, 38 (1995-1996)
(arguing that binding international human rights norms can be discovered through examination of
liberal national constitutions, and are "not based on
state practice at all").
13. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 810-16 (Bork, J., concurring); Alfred P Rubin, Professor
D'Amato Concept of American Jurisdiction is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 105, 105-06
(1985). The Doe v. Unocal defendants and the Department of Justice showed their sympathies in briefs
submitted to the en bane panel reviewing the case. Both featured as their main arguments Bork's
position that ATCA does not provide a cause of action. Supplemental Brief of Defendants-Appellees,
Doe v. Unocal, filed April 23, 2003, available at http://www.unocal.com/myanmar/enbancbrief (last
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with a modernized Paquete Habana, the Court should resist Bork's historically
inaccurate position but at the same time reject the new, non-consensual, nonpositivist customary international law
After briefly describing the human rights violations in Burma that gave rise to
litigation against Unocal, this paper begins to connect ATCA with those wrongs by
examining the early history of the alien tort statute, particularly its original
purpose. The paper finds that early history generally in harmony with the statute's
revival in modern international human rights litigation, which includes the Unocal
litigation. The paper begins discussion of the modem era with Filartigav. PenaIrala, an offspring of the birth of modem international human rights law in the
Nuremberg Tribunal. The discussion of ATCA concludes by reviewing the
controversy surrounding Judge Bork's opinion in the Tel-Oren decision, and finds
the Filartigahuman rights litigation tradition more compatible with an originalist
understanding of ATCA than Judge Bork's ATCA scholarship.
Finally the paper examines the Unocal litigation, particularly the Unocal III
decision, which employed a notion of customary international law that appears to
escape the boundaries of the Filartiga tradition, deriving its legal standards
inappropriately from Nuremberg-style ad hoc criminal tribunals. Such a practice
inaccurately suggests that the tribunals have established a customary international
law independent of the practice of sovereign states and their legal systems. A
common-sense examination of choice of law principles suggests the Paquete
Habana methodology be applied not merely to primary violations of customary
international law, such as the forced labor allegations against the Myanmar
military government, but also to substantive legal issues ancillary to the primary
ones, in this instance the third-party complicity standard to be applied to Unocal's
behavior.
II.

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BURMA

The Unocal decisions concern a class action suit brought by farmers from the
Tenasserim region of Burma, also internationally recognized as Myanmar, against,
among others, Unocal Corp. ("Unocal"), Total S.A. ("Total"), and Burma's

visited Feb. 2, 2004); Brief for the United States of America As Amicus Curiae, May 8, 2003, available
at http://www.unocal.com/myanmar/doj/pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2004). The plaintiffs filed a response
to the Department of Justice brief. Plaintiffs-Appellants Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Amicus
Curiae Brief Filed by the United States, filed June 2, 2003, available at http://www.ccrny.org/v2/legal/corporate-accountability/docs/OppositionBrieftoDOJ.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
At the en banc hearing, Ninth Circuit judges showed little interest in the approach to ATCA taken by
Judge Bork. See Hoppin, supra note 6 ("Several times when [Unocal lawyer M. Randall Oppenheimer]
was asked about aiding and abetting standards, he responded with the caveat that he was only engaging
the question hypothetically, since he believes the case cannot be brought under the ATCA. The judges
seemed to pay little mind to his protestations."). See also Coyle, supra note 9 (noting that the en banc
9th Circuit - in its June, 2003 Alvarez-Macham v. U.S., No. 99-56772, and Alvarez-Macham v. Sosa,
No. 99-56880 decisions ignored the Justice Department's argument that ATCA does not create a
cause of action and therefore does not allow aliens to bring claims for conduct taking place in other
countries).

2004

PAQUETE HABANA APPROACH TO THE RESCUE

military government. 4 The farmers alleged that the Burmese military had
committed international human rights violations through a state-owned oil and gas
company in furtherance of a Unocal, Total, and Burmese military joint venture, the
Yadana gas pipeline project.' 5 The Burmese military and security forces allegedly
used the farmers as slave labor for the pipeline project, and raped, tortured and
murdered those who refused to participate. 16 Plaintiffs alleged that Unocal and
Total, by using the services of the Burmese security forces with some awareness of
their practices, had used the Burmese farmers as slave labor for the pipeline
project.1 7 Successive Burma regimes have a "long and well-known history of
imposing forced labor on their citizens."' 8
The Unocal litigation originated with a Burmese trade union leader, U Maung
Maung, and his serendipitous contact with a Georgetown law school student,
Douglas Steele.i 9 U Maung Maung, an exile in Thailand, was dismayed by the
flood of refugees escaping from Burma who told him of forced labor and
associated rape, torture and murder on the Unocal-Total pipeline project. 20 He
wondered aloud to Steele whether any action could be brought against Unocal in
U.S. courts, and Steele investigated. 2' Steele ultimately contacted the International
Labor Rights Fund in Washington, D.C., 22 which then filed a claim against Unocal
in September 1996.23 The claim was the first ATCA-based international human
rights action against a U.S. corporation.24
Ill. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT, FROM INTENT TO REVIVAL

A. OriginalIntent and Early History
A legal understanding of the case brought against Unocal must begin with an

14. Burma's military government is called the State Law and Order Restoration Council. Unocal
I and Unocal If use the acronym SLORC. Unocal If, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1296; Unocal 1, 963 F Supp. at
883. Unocal III instead uses the term "the Myanmar military. Unocal I1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS
19263 at 3.
15. Unocal 1, 963 F Supp. at 883.
16. Id.
17 Id.
18. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at4.
19. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 187 (2002).
20. Id. (U Maung Maung was General Secretary of the Federation of Trade Unions of Burma
(FTUB).).
21. Id. (Steele was working as a legal intern for an advisor to the FTUB.).
22. The International Labor Rights Fund website is www.laborrights.org. Two other NGOs
assisting the plaintiffs are EarthRights International of Washington, D.C. and Chiang Mai, Thailand,
whose Unocal webpage is at http://www.earthnghts.org/unocal/index.shtml, and New York's Center for
Constitutional Rights, whose Doe v. Unocal webpage is http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
corporate accountability/corporateArticle.asp?ObjlD=lrRSFKnmmm&Content--45 (last visited Mar.
10, 2004).
23. See Collingsworth, supranote 19, at 187.
24. Id.
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understanding of ATCA, but based on more than the statute's reasonably clear
wording. ATCA, adopted in 1789 and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, declares that
the federal district courts have "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien

for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. ' 2s The statute, from its wording, allows a civil action to be brought
in federal courts (1) by an alien (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of
international law. Who can be sued is not limited, and therefore might include
26
aliens as well as U.S. citizens.

However, the statute's rare use before its human rights litigation revival only twenty-one cases had invoked jurisdiction under ATCA before 198027 _ made
courts and scholars anxious that revived usage accord with the statute's original

meaning and purpose. 28 Thus, courts have strived to interpret ATCA in light of
Judge Learned Hand's counsel that "statutes always have some purpose or object
to accomplish, whose
sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to
29
their meaning.,

Yet the statute was once famously declared "a kind of legal Lohengrin, 3 ° and
a complete account of its purpose and object may not be possible. For example,
there is no record of discussions in Congress leading up to ATCA s enactment. 3
Nonetheless, many windows into Congressional thinking are available,2 and the
origins and general purposes of ATCA turn out to be reasonably clear.
First of

25. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
26. The class of defendants would, in time, be restricted to aliens alone, though neither the statute
nor the limited early case law implies such a restriction. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 222 n.6.
27 See Kenneth C. Randall, FederalJurisdictionover InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into
the Alien Tort Claims Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1,4-5 n. 15 (1985).
28. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the JudiciaryAct of 1789" A Badge of
Honor 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 461, 463 (1989) ("The current debate over the meaning and scope of the
Statute is being waged on historical turf.
An original intent argument may seem particularly
attractive because the Statute virtually lay fallow for 200 years.") (Anne-Marie Burley would later
change her name to Anne-Marie Slaughter). For thorough examinations of ATCA's background and
historical context, see the concumng opinions of Judge Bork and Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
29 Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
30. liT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that "although it has been with us
since the first Judiciary Act
no one seems to know whence it came."). Lohengrm, legendary
figure depicted in the Wagner opera of the same name, was mysterious knight who refused to reveal
his full identity to his bride. See Courtney Shaw, Note, UncertainJustice: Liability of Multinationals
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV 1359, 1365 n.33 (2002).
31. See Ivan Poullaos, The Nature of the Beast: Using the Alien Tort Claims Act to Combat
InternationalHuman Rights Violations, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 327, 329 (2002); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812
(Bork, J., concurring) (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 782-833 (J. Gales ed., 1789)) ("The debates over the
Judiciary Act in the House-the Senate debates were not recorded-nowhere mention the provision,
not even, so far as we are aware, indirectly.").
32. See Randall, supra note 27, at II ("True, no specific legislative history exists on the Judiciary
Act; but other historical and legislative sources, when pieced together, adequately indicate the statute's
origins and purposes."); William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 692 n.27 (2002) [hereinafter Dodge 11]
(declaring that, in the wake of considerable legal historical research, "it is fair to say that the Alien Tort
Statute is no longer 'legal Lohengrin'
").
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all, and broadly, it is evident the statute was a product of an effort by a militarily
weak nation reliant on international commerce to gain control over its voice in
foreign relations. 33 One element of that voice was treatment of tort actions by
foreigners for international law violations. 34
Scholarly disagreement arises when discussion moves from general to more
specific purposes for the statute. Scholars pose two specific purposes (both will be

discussed in detail shortly). First, many see a "defensive" purpose: ATCA was
conceived as a defensive measure to remove a potential cause for international
conflict with the U.S. from the diplomatic arsenal of aggressive mercantile
powers. A second viewpoint is that the statute has an "assertive" purpose: ATCA
was a by-product and expression of a struggle by neutrals for "free trade" with
belligerent nations during an era of near constant war.36 The United States took up
this campaign alongside other militarily weak nations dependent on international
commerce, and the battle was waged by means of moral persuasion; there was little
else to work with against the mercantile world powers.37 The moral character of
the struggle made it both natural and strategic to remove resolution of international
law disputes, including alien tort suits, from the "interested" political branches to
the loftier realm of the judiciary 38 The judiciary's job, after all, was to detect,
define and interpret natural law and morality, and the federal judiciary could best
be expected to establish a uniform and prominent national position on the law of
nations in accord with and supportive of U.S. policy and commercial interests.39
Actually, there need be no real disagreement over ATCA's specific purposes:

the two objectives described are both compatible and supported by substantial

histoncal evidence. 40 Therefore, this paper will proceed under the well-supported

33. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964) (describing ATCA as
one of several provisions in the Judiciary Act "reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's
dealings with foreign nations and indicating desire to give matters of international significance to the
jurisdiction of federal institutions"); see also Randall, supra note 27, at 72 ("[Tlhe federal government's
plenary authority over matters touching foreign relations motivated the statute's promulgation.").
34. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812 (Bork, J., concumng) ("ITlhose who drafted the Constitution
and the Judiciary Act of 1789 wanted to open federal courts to aliens for the purpose of avoiding, not
provoking, conflicts with other nations."); Randall, supra note 27 at 72 ("[T]he statute's origin and
purpose are
linked to the drafters' concern with extending federal authority over certain tort actions
brought by aliens where federal jurisdiction might otherwise have been unavailable
"); see
generally Dodge I, supra note 3 (discussing the treatment of foreign tort actions for international law
violations).
35. See, e.g., Stewart Jay, The Status of the Lav of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 819, 840 (1989) ("At the practical level, the need to avoid violation that would give more
powerful country cause for war explained the insistence on following the law of nations."); Anthony
D'Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J.INT'L L. 62, 64
(1988).
36. See generally Sylvester, supra note 2. Sylvester's thesis will be more thoroughly explored
later in this subsection.
37 See id.
38. See td.
39 See id.
40. Sylvester, the scholar who makes the case for the assertive purpose, acknowledges that both
purposes exist: "Legal historians and scholars alike believe that the law of nations was used as a shield.
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supposition that ATCA had both defensive and assertive purposes.
The
comparative priority Congress gave to those two goals remains uncertain, yet this
is not critical for a modem understanding of ATCA in the human rights litigation

context.
However, in order to gain the best possible understanding of Congressional
intent and how it might fit with use of the statute for redress of international human

rights violations, a more detailed grasp of the background and context of the statute
and its purposes is necessary Regarding the "defensive" purpose, in 1789 a
powerful enemy could interpret denial of an adequate judicial forum to an alien
tort claimant as official approval of the wrongful tort against the alien, and,
consequently as an affront to the foreigner's home country 41 Emmerich de Vattel,
the most influential international law scholar in the early days of the United States,
specifically stated that "denial of justice" to aliens abroad was one justification for
initiation of a war of reprisal by the foreign national's home country 42
Consequently, before ATCA, if a state court mishandled an alien tort claim - with
no federal influence over that forum and no judicial alternative provided for the
alien - the incident could readily be transformed into a transnational insult,
drawing the United States into a war or lesser international incident.43 Therefore, a
standard contention is that ATCA's primary attraction was its assurance against, or
at least maximization of federal control over, such a scenario. 44 As Alexander

Hamilton commented in the Federalist Papers, "[a]s the denial or perversion of
A proper understanding of the period demonstrates that it was used just as often as sword to achieve
specific policy goals of the young country. Id at 7 For further discussion of the defensive purpose,
see D'Amato, supra note 35, at 64.
41. Kathryn L. Pryor, Does the Torture Victim Protection Act Signal the Imminent Demise of the
Alien Tort Claims Act? 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 969, 971 (1989).

42. See D'Amato, supra note 35, at 64. The quotation is from 2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW
OF NATIONs 230-31 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916) (1758).
Although on this matter he reflected a wide consensus, Vattel was less influential in France and Britain
than he was among the militarily weak trading nations. See generally Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William
Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 731

(1976) (discussing Blackstone's influence on the Founders.).
43. Pryor, supra note 41, at 972. See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 783 (Edwards, J., concurring):
Under the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice accessible for
If the
claims of foreign subjects against individuals within the state's territory
court's decision constitutes a denial of justice, or if it appears to condone the original
wrongful act, under the law of nations the United States would become responsible for
the failure of its courts
A pnvate act, committed by an individual against an
individual, might thereby escalate into an international confrontation.
Id.
44. See D'Amato, supra note 35, at 63:

ATCA's original, overriding purpose was to maintain a rigorous neutrality in the face of
the warring European powers. The United States was still weak militarily, compared to
England, France and Spain. Many years would be needed before the new nation could
stand firm against any aggressive threat from abroad. During the formative years of
buildup, it was imperative that no excuse, no casus belli, be given to a foreign power.
Id, see also The Federalist No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) quoted in
Dodge I, supra note 3, at 236 [hereinafter The Federalist No. 801. The Federalist Papers were originally
published in 1787 and 1788.
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justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason
classed among the just causes of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought
to have cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are
concerned., 45 Before long, ATCA would provide such federal cognizance over
torts in violation of international law.
One "defensive" concern vis-a-vis the Great Powers of the day involved state
courts' refusal to enforce treaties between the federal government and foreign
nations. 46 Of particular concern, the treaty ending the Revolutionary War
promised payment of debts to British creditors, but in fact state courts often
blocked Britain's efforts to collect the debts.47 As a result, Bntain repeatedly
threatened reprisals, which jeopardized U.S. security.48 ATCA could have
provided a means of redress, because treaty violation injuries were torts in
violation of the law of nations.
Further examples of the federal powerlessness the new Congress wanted to
alleviate with ATCA include two 1780s violations of diplomatic privileges. The
better-known "Marbois Affair" concerned a 1784 threat and assault upon French
Consul General Francis Barbe Marbois in Philadelphia. 49 An international clamor
ensued, the case was widely discussed among key federal figures, and Congress
stepped in to offer a reward for capture of the French assailant, Chevalier De
Longchamps.50
However, the federal government could do no more because it did not have
judicial jurisdiction over the crimes or torts in violation of international law This
inadequacy was of wide concern, and in 1785 the Continental Congress was forced
to explain to Marbois that federal powers were confined by "the nature of the
federal union in which each State retains a distinct and absolute sovereignty in all
matters not expressly delegated to Congress leaving them only that of advising in
many of those cases in which other governments decree.'
From the national perspective, Pennsylvania handled Longchamp's criminal
prosecution well: he was tried and convicted of violating the law of nations, which
was held to be part of Pennsylvania common law 52 A civil action was not
available to aliens under Pennsylvania law - the state had disregarded a 178153
Congressional resolution asking that such redress be made available by the states
45. The Federalist No. 80, supra note 44, at 476. Note that such purpose for ATCA indicates it
can be used against foreign as well as U.S. nationals when a "law of nations" tort is committed. See
Dodge I, supra note 3, at 222.
46. Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress Power To "Define and Punish
Offenses Against the Law of Nations 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 447, 466 (2000).
47 Id. at 466-67.
48. Id. at 467.
49. The details of the story are not in dispute. This summary is drawn from Dodge I, supra note 3,
at 229-30 and Dodge 11,supra note 32, at 693-95.
50. See Dodge 1,supra note 3, at 229-30; Stephens, supra note 46, at 466.
51. 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 314 (Library of Congress ed.,
1912), quoted in Dodge I, supra note 3, at 229-30.
52. Dodge I, supra note 3, at 230.
53. See Dodge II, supra note 32, at 692-93; Dodge I, supra note 3, at 229-30.
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- and no tort suit was filed in the affair. 54
The other display of federal inability to punish a violation of diplomatic
privileges occurred in 1788, when a New York City police officer entered Dutch
ambassador Van Berckel's residence and arrested one of his servants.55 Secretary
Jay complained that the federal government apparently was not vested "with any56
judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases.
Fortunately for relations with Holland, a state court found the officer guilty of
violating international law and sentenced him to three months in jail. 5 7
Fears in Congress that other states would not handle law of nations violations
as well as Pennsylvania had led to passage of a 1785 resolution asking Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, John Jay "to report the draft of an act to be recommended to the
legislatures of the respective states, for punishing the infractions of the laws of
nations, and more especially for securing the privileges and immunities of public
Ministers from foreign powers. ' 'Si There is no record of Jay having prepared such
a draft.
Perhaps Jay was discouraged by the feeble response to the 1781
Congressional recommendation mentioned in reference to the Marbois affair. That
resolution had asked states to create criminal sanctions for certain international law
violations against aliens, and to authorize "(1) tort suits by the injured party against
the tortfeasor, and (2) suits by the United States against the tortfeasor to reimburse
the United States for compensation paid to the injured party "'9 While the text of
the resolution indicates the tortfeasor in the second case had to be a U.S. citizen, a
Connecticut bill in response to the Congressional resolution went further and
allowed such suits against "any Person or Persons whatsoever." 6
Unlike
Connecticut, however, it appears many states did not follow up on Congressional
urging that they provide for criminal sanctions and law suits against law of nations
violators.61

The figure of Oliver Ellsworth ties the Congressional recommendations with
the state and federal statutory acts. He was a member of the Continental Congress
that passed the 1781 resolution asking states to enact laws allowing damage suits
and establishing criminal sanctions for international law violations against aliens.62

54. See Dodge II, supra note 32, at 694-95.
55. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 230.
56. See 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at I I1 (Library of Congress
ed., 1912), quoted in Dodge I, supra note 3, at 230.
57 See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 230.
58. 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 655 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912),
quoted in Dodge I, supra note 32, at 694 n.39.
59. See Dodge i, supra note 32, at 692-93.
60. See id. at 693 (quoting 4 THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT FOR THE

YEAR 1782, at 157 (Leonard Woods Labaree ed., 1942)).
61. See Dodge I1,supra note 32, at 694-95.
62. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 228-29. The recommendation asked states to enact laws that
would "authorise suits to be instituted for damages by the party injured, and for compensation to the
United States for damage sustained by them from an injury done to a foreign power by citizen.
Dodge I, supra note 32, at 692 (quoting 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at
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Ellsworth was also a member of the 1782 Connecticut General Assembly that
responded as described above to the 1781 Congressional recommendation.63
Finally, he was responsible for writing most of the Judiciary Act of 1789
including section 9 64 The ATCA sub-section of section 9 gave district courts
jurisdiction over suits brought by an injured alien against a tortfeasor for law of
nations violations, in keeping with the 1781 recommendation and Connecticut
law.65
In sum, ATCA achieves its defensive purpose through its perceived ability to
placate foreign powers with the federal courts' more consistent and less biased
stance toward foreigners, when compared to state courts. 66 Congress believed that
federal courts were more likely to give to alien claims what the non-citizen's home
country would regard as fair consideration. Federal courts would also be expected
67
to be more sensitive to any U.S. national interests implicated by alien claims.
It is important to note the joining together of crime and tort in the 1781
Congressional Resolution, the 1782 Connecticut law, and the 1789 Judiciary Act.
Evident in the 1781 resolution, for example, was an intention to expand the
nation's civil liability international law duties beyond the very limited scope set
down by Blackstone.6 8 Anne-Marie Burley argues the wider scope of redress
recommended in the Resolution "was an entirely logical addition, implicitly
recognizing that justice under the law of nations could require making the victim
whole as well as punishing the transgressor., 69 The Judiciary Act of 1789 carred
forward the concept of parallel civil and criminal sanctions for law of nations
violations, granting federal courts jurisdiction over common-law crimes
"cognizable under the authority of the United States" - which included crimes in
violation of international law - alongside federal jurisdiction and a cause of action
for alien tort claims. 70 Judiciary Act author Ellsworth appeared to suppose, quite
reasonably, that there might be a variety of possible offenses against international
H 36-37 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912)).
63. See Dodge II, supra note 32, at 692-93. Dodge noted that the Connecticut statute allows suits
by aliens for any tort, notjust for torts in violation of the law of nations. Id. at 693 n.32.
64. Id. at 695.
65. Id. at 695-96.
66. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 782-83; see also Dodge 1,supra note 3, at 235 (writing that among
the factors motivating provision of the alien tort statute were "a desire for uniformity in the
interpretation of the law of nations, and fear that state courts would be hostile to alien claims."). As
matters turned out, due to gaps in Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, federal judicial uniformity was
not all it could have been. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 235 n.101, William S. Dodge, Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the OriginalJurisdiction Clause Suggests an
"EssentialRole 100 YALE L.J. 1013, 1017 n.19 (1991).
67 Pryor, supra note 41, at 971.
68. Judge Blackstone saw law of nations violations pnmarily as crimes, but also wrote that civil
liability was available under the law of nations in the form of restitution against a transgressor for
violation of safe-conduct. See Dodge I, supra note 3, at 226 n.35 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 69-70 (1765)); see also Burley, supra note 28, at 477 n.74
(explaining that the "recommended authonzation of tort suits exceeds the scope of the duty outlined by
Blackstone, who refers only to criminal sanctions").
69. Burley, supra note 28, at 477.
70. See Dodge 1,supranote 3, at 231 (quoting Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, I Stat. 73, 76-77 (1789)).
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law, some of which were best resolved by criminal sanctions, others by civil
damages 7to the injured, and some by a combination of criminal and civil
sanctions.
As with the "defensive" purpose, there is also sufficient evidence for an
"assertive" purpose for ATCA. That evidence, however, takes a more abstract
turn, starting with the Founders' fondness for Vattel and "Continental"
international law doctrine.72 That doctrine was aligned with U.S. commercial and
security interests and early leaders of the United States made it their own.73
Furthermore, U.S. leaders wanted to lift up Continental doctrine against rival
Anglo-French doctrine, or, more accurately, establish it against the Anglo-French
opposition to Continental law of nations doctrine becoming the widely accepted
international law 74 This provided an assertive purpose for ATCA, in the hope that
it would promote and solidify international acceptance of Continental international
law doctrine as the international law doctrine, by subjecting international tort
conflicts to a consistent and "disinterested" U.S. judicial treatment which also
happened to advance and establish Continental doctrine."
The specific doctrinal concern of early U.S. leaders, in an era of near constant
military conflict between France and Britain, was the degree to which international
law would favor belligerent or neutral rights in commerce.76 The Americans
advocated an understanding of the law of nations that strongly favored neutral
rights. 7
Vattel was the most prominent of the American "pantheon" of
international law jurists promoting that conception. 78 In fact, early post-Colonial
judicial decisions cited almost exclusively to five international law scholars from
71. Burley, supra note 28, at 477
72. "The Continent" generally describes the European nations other than the two mercantile
heavyweights, France and Great Britain.
73. Sylvester, supra note 2, at 66 ("To start, it must be understood that the American' theory of
the law of nations was an adaptation of the Continental philosophies on the law of nations.").
74. See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 43-44, 66.
75. See id. at 30-3 1.
76. It was "an age of the basest diplomatic intrigue, of hostilities too rarely assuaged in periods of
peace, and of the utmost ruthlessness in the conduct of hostilities.
Edwin Dickinson, Changing
Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation,26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 241 (1932), quoted in Sylvester,
supranote 2, at 5.
77 See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 37, 64.
78. Dickinson, supra note 76, at 259 n. 132, quoted in Sylvester, supranote 2, at 67; See also Sean
D. Murphy, The U.S. Lawyer-Statesman At Times Of Crisis: A Look at Colonial America, 95 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 99, 105 (2001) ("[l~n the thirty years after ratification of the Constitution, U.S.
courts would turn to Vattel as their favorite authority on the theory of international law."); Jay, supra
note 35, at 823 ("In ascertaining principles of the law of nations, lawyers and judges of [the postcolonial] era relied heavily on Continental treatise writers, Vattel being the most often consulted by
Americans."). As Sylvester explained:
Grotius, Bynkershoek, Wolff, Vattel, and Pufendorf formed the American pantheon of
writers on the law of nations. According to Edwin Dickinson, early American judicial
decisions implicating the law of nations cited almost exclusively to these Continental
writers, and they were quoted quite frequently for propositions about the law of nations:
in all, in the 1780s and 1790s, there were nine citations to Pufendorf, sixteen to Grotius,
twenty-five to Bynkershoek, and a staggering ninety-two to Vattel.
Sylvester, supra note 2 at 67. The Dickinson reference is to Dickinson, supranote 76, at 259 n. 132.
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three nations - the Netherlands, Austria, and Denmark - which, like the United
States, depended heavily on international trade for their economic prosperity were
militarily weak, and were generally neutrals in wars between the mercantile
powers. 79 "Not surprisingly, writes Douglas Sylvester, "their understandings of
the law of nations heavily favored neutral rights at the expense of belligerent
rights. In so doing, these writers envisioned an international society predicated on
peaceful relationships forged through trade. 80
The early leaders of the Republic were very much attracted to Vattel's vision
of an international relations based on natural law guaranteeing security and the
benefits of trade to all states large and small. 8' Under Vattel's international law
standard, which he believed continental Europe already reflected, the concerted
power of the entire community of nations would overcome any country that dared
suppress the rights of another, both out of obligation and from 8realization
of the
2
commercial and security benefits of the rule of the law of nations.
The new nation's leaders were idealistic enough to believe that successful
promotion of Continental international law might allow U.S. relations with the
world to stabilize into such a Vattelian system.83 Thus, in the Republic's early
years, the United States engaged in a "proactive foreign policy based not on simple
nationalistic self-interest, but rather, based on promotion, through advancement of
the Continental/American law of nations doctrine, of de-militarized, commercedriven international relations. 84 Specifically the promotion of Continental doctnne
derived from two central hopes of early American foreign policy- "first, that
international commerce should be predicated on a theory of neutral rights and free
trade, and second, that economic measures, not armed conflict, were the proper
response to belligerence. 85
These views conflicted with those of the dominant mercantile powers,
England and France. In fact, Edmund Genet, minister of France to the United
States in the early 1790s, belittled the international status of neutral rights as
"diplomatic subtleties" and "aphorisms of Vattel and others." 86
England more explicitly challenged what would later be the American
position on neutral rights when it announced, in 1756, that the commerce of neutral

79. See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 40-4 1.
80. See id. at 67.
81. See EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, at lxii (Joseph Chitty ed., 1863) (1758)
("A dwarf is as much man as a giant; small Republic is no less sovereign state than the most
powerful kingdom."), quoted in Jay, supra note 35, at 840.
82. See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 4 1.
83. For an example of such idealism, see the Judge Wilson quotation at the beginning of this
article.
84. Sylvester, supra note 2, at 41.
85. Id. at 43.
86. Sylvester, supra note 2, at 43 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Gouverneur Morris,
United States Minister to France (Aug. 16, 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 371, 379
(quoting Letter from Edmund Genet to Thomas Jefferson (June 22, 1793)) (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
1899)).
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87
nations with belligerent states in wartime would be restricted to peacetime levels.
Continental theory and its U.S. advocates advanced the much more liberal neutral
trading rights doctrine: that a neutral had an unrestricted right to trade with
belligerents during a war. As Thomas Jefferson argued:

[Wihen two nations go to war, those who chuse [sic] to live in peace retain their
natural right to pursue their [commerce], to carry the produce of their industry, for
exchange, to all nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual, to go and come freely
without injury or molestation,
and in short, that the war among others shall be for
88
them as if it did not exist.
U.S. advocates of Continental law of nations theory also favored the "free
ships" doctrine, which precluded from seizure all goods found in a neutral vessel,
including belligerent goods.89 Under this understanding, if France, while at war
with Great Britain, were to stop an Amencan ship9 and find English goods on
board, those goods would not be condemned as prize. 0
In federal judicial decisions of the 1790s, neutral rights were occasionally a
topic of contention and judges did advance Continental law of nations doctrine. 9'
With international law within their control, Sylvester writes, "federal courts used
their decisions to support the needs of a commerce-based system. In order to do
this, the law of nations needed to strengthen commitments towards neutral tradeat the expense of belligerent nghts. 92 Nonetheless, "it was only by rigorous
application, even in cases against the specific interests of Americans, that these
rights could hope to be vindicated in international relations. 9 3 ATCA's assertive
purpose of promoting Continental doctrine on neutral rights and free trade fit into
this overall strategy
Nonetheless, despite the statute's embodiment of the assertive and previously
described defensive objectives, courts rarely dealt with ATCA. In the 1790s, only
two cases and one U.S. Attorney General opinion are available for possible insight
into the statute's original intent. 94 In the first case, Moxon v. The Fanny,95 a 1793

87 See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 45.
88. Id. at 44 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (Dec. 20, 1793), in 27
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 55 (Julian P Boyd ed., 1953)).
89. Sylvester, supra note 2, at 44 ("In the 1780s Congress codified [the free ships doctrine] into
American law, and at least once this enactment formed the rule of decision ina case.").
90. Id. at 44. Pnze is defined as the wartime capture of ships or cargo, by privateers and other
forces of belligerent nations dunng time of war, and is "therefore liable to being condemned or
appropriated as enemy property. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1218 (7th ed. 1999).
91. See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 31-36.
92. Id. at 64.
93. Id. at 35.
94. Dodge 1,supra note 3, at 251. However, there are likely other cases or Attorney General
opinions unrecorded or unpreserved. William Casto notes an early Attorney General opinion that does
not explicitly mention ATCA but does refer to an ambassador prosecuting "an indictment in distnct
court" this appears to rely on the statute because an ambassador could not prosecute cnminal suit.
Casto, supra note 2, at 504 n.208 (discussing I Op. Att'y Gen. 141 (1804)).
95. Moxon v. Fanny, 17 F Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793)
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district court denied federal court jurisdiction
stated in dicta that ATCA jurisdiction would
political question roadblock, because plaintiffs
damages. 97 Therefore, they had not sued
demanded. 98

on political question grounds, 96 but
have been denied even without the
had sued for both restitution and for
for a "tort only" as the statute

The second case, Bolchos v. Darrel," involved a French privateer's capture of
slaves mortgaged to a Spanish citizen, where the mortgagee was a British
citizen.' 0 0 In port, the mortgagee's agent seized the slaves.' 0' The privateer
brought suit for the proceeds of the sale.' 0 2 On an initial matter, the court claimed
jurisdiction in the admiralty '03 It then added, on its jurisdictional right:
gives this court concurrent
Besides, as the 9th section of the judiciary act
jurisdiction with the state courts and circuit court of the United States where an
alien sues for a tort, in violation of the law
°4 of nations, or a treaty of the United
States, I dismiss all doubt upon this point.'
The proceeding indicated that ATCA grants more than jurisdiction in the
admiralty, and that the statute's grant is in fact the wide-ranging one indicated on
its face. 105 In any event, though the court stated it would have restored the
property to the neutral Spanish mortgagor under the law of nations, it ruled in
favor of the French privateer because of a treaty between the U.S. and France
stating that "the property of friends found on board the vessels of an enemy shall
be forfeited."' °6
In 1795, the same year as Bolchos, ATCA was suggested as a remedy for
victims of an attack on the British colony of Sierra Leone by a French fleet led by
an American slave trader.i °7 The British Ambassador officially protested, and
doing nothing was not a safe response. However, if the United States paid
96. Id.. at 946-47
97 Id. at 945.
98. Dodge 1,supra note 3, at 252. As Dodge stated, the interpretation of the court was that "only"
meant only one remedy for damages could be sought under ATCA, which meant the Moxon suit could
have been made acceptable to the court simply by deleting from it the restitution claim. Id. This is
contrary to another possible interpretation of "for a tort only" under which, if the events at issue give
rise to types of claims in addition to tort claims, the federal court must refuse jurisdiction. See Joseph
M. Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP L. REV. 445,
482 (1995) (stating that ATCA was directed at captures of prize in which "the legality of the capture
was not in issue, and the suit was 'only' for the reparation in damages of a wrong related to a capture");
see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377, 377-78 (2nd Cir. 1996) (rejecting Sweeney's restrictive
interpretation of ATCA); Dodge I,supra note 3, at 243-56 (answering Sweeney's argument).
99. Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795).
at810.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. This contrasts with Sweeney's restrictive claims regarding ATCA's applicability. See
Sweeney, supra note 98, at 482.
106. Id. at 811.
107 D'Amato, supra note 35, at 66.
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reparations directly to Great Britain surely France would have been angered. 1 8
"Fortunately the Founding Fathers had foreseen this very dilemma a half-dozen
years earlier when they enacted the Alien Tort Statute, writes modem
commentator Anthony D'Amato. Attorney General William Bradford issued an
official opinion directing the British to the statute, which offered a solution
especially felicitous for the United States since an ATCA suit by the British would
have necessitated litigating from the standpoint of the Continental/American
understanding of the law of nations.i09
Then for 185 years activity dropped off considerably, for reasons that are
uncertain. ' 1 One reason may have been that for most of those years the law of
nations was understood to concern, with rare exception, affairs between nations
and not between individuals and nations."' Also, the wider purposes of the statute
rapidly fell away, as the U.S. effort to establish a Continental doctrine of neutral
rights and free trade was overwhelmed by the need to accommodate the mercantile
powers, France and Great Britain.i 12
The discussion of purposes and objects now complete, several implications of
ATCA s original meaning and purpose appear relevant to the revival of the statute
as a vehicle for international human rights actions. First of all, ATCA served a
straightforward general purpose of advancing the national interest by putting a
federal stamp on the law of nations, this having both defensive and assertive
motivations.
Second, and the historical context of the assertive objective
especially puts this on view, Congressional leaders saw the statute as part of an
effort to put the legal "voice" of the United States consistently behind one version
of international law during a time of international conflict over the "true" law of

108. Id.
109. Specifically, Bradford stated:
[Tihere can be no doubt that the company [the Sierra Leone company] or individuals
who have been injured by these acts of hostility have remedy by a civil suit in the
courts of the United States; jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases
where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the laws of nations, or a treaty of the
United States;
such a suit may be maintained by evidence taken at a distance, on a
commission issued for that purpose.
D'Amato, supra note 35, at 66 (quoting I Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795)). Similarly, 1907 opinion of
the Attorney General, regarding injuries caused by violation of a U.S. treaty covering the Rio Grande
U.S.-Mexican border, stated that ATCA provided both jurisdiction and cause of action for the private
Mexican citizens who wanted to sue. See 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907), discussed in Randall, supra
note 27, at 49-50.
110. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Rogue Regimes and the Individualization of International Law, 36

816 (2002).
1!l. Id.Although several exceptions have been widely accepted, the Westphalian formulation of
relations between nations held that "what sovereign governments did within their own borders was of
no concern to their neighbors. States were the subjects of international law; international law regulated
only political and economic relations between states, not within them. Id.
112. The "fragile consensus" in the United States for pursuit, through non-military measures, of an
international system based on neutral rights and free trade had been destroyed by 1809. Sylvester,
supra note 2, at 55. "Unfortunately for the new country, without sufficient economic or military power
to force adherence to neutral trading doctrines, this foreign policy was doomed to failure in the wake of
the great conflicts of the 1790s and 1800s. Id. at 44-45.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 815,
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nations doctnne. Therefore, the assertive purpose for the statute assumes the
malleability of international law, since that purpose was to establish more firmly or
to reform the law of nations advantageously for the United States. The nobler
language of the day stated that international law had recently improved with the
times, 113 and would conceivably develop further in the future.' 1 4 The law of
nations was understood as changeable, even though it was derived from and a
subclass of immutable natural law, because it was a reflection of human reason's
11
only gradual and imperfect progression in awareness of underlying natural law. 5
A third implication is that the apparent original understanding of the statute was
that it might be employed in a wide variety of alien tort claims. Congress
evidently meant what the statute's broad language says, and did not want ATCA
only to be applied to a specific subclass of torts, for instance those ancillary to the
capture of "pnze.'i16 Finally, and this awaits further exploration in the following
sub-section, ATCA was originally understood to provide plaintiffs with both a
general and specific cause of action.i 17 This last matter became quite controversial
early in the modem revival of ATCA as a vehicle for international human rights
actions. 118
B.

The FilartigaTradition: The Alien Tort Claims Act's Modern Revival

Until 1980, only twenty-one cases had invoked jurisdiction under ATCA, and
no one, human rights advocates included, had paid much attention to it. 119 In that
year, however, a victim of crimes against humanity in Paraguay successfully used
ATCA in a U.S. federal court. 12° Dr. Joel Filartiga, a Paraguayan physician who
had arrived in the United States in 1978, alleged that Americo Pefla-lrala was
responsible for the torture and killing of Filartiga's seventeen-year-old son.12 1 The
113. Jefferson stated in 1793 that the pnnciples of the law of nations "have been liberalized in latter
See Sylvester, supra note 2, at 59 (quoting Letter
times by the refinement of manners and morals
from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (May 7, 1793), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 243 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899)). Further, Jefferson would write in 1816:
[L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As
that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new
truths disclosed, and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 42-43 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899), quoted in Sylvester, supra note 2, at 59.
114. The decision in Habana was guided in part by just such progress in the law of nations. The
question was whether fishing ships were protected by international law from capture dunng wartime.
Though 1798 English case had stated such protection was a rule only of international comity, the
Court held that "the period of hundred years which has since elapsed is amply sufficient to have
enabled what originally may have rested in custom or comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by the

general assent of civilized nations, into asettled rule of international law. Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
115. See 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42-43, quoted in Sylvester, supra note 112.
116. See Sweeney, supra note 98, at 482.
117 See Dodge 1,supra note 3, at 237-40.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. at 221,251.
See Randall, supra note 27, at 4-5 n.15.
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876.
Id. at 878.
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Filartigas initiated legal action in Paraguay but their attorney was arrested,
threatened with death by Pefila-Irala, and disbarred without just cause.122 In 1979
23
Pefla-Irala was discovered living in the United States and held for deportation.1
A federal court served a summons on him for wrongfully causing the death of
Filartiga's son and plaintiffs sought to have the deportation enjoined to ensure
Pefla-Irala's availability for trial. 124The legal action was brought principally under
the jurisdiction of ATCA. 25 A lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, and during the appeal Pefla-Irala was deported back to
Paraguay. 126
The lower court decision was reversed in favor of Filartiga by appellate judge
Irving R. Kaufman, who found ATCA applicable in its provision for federal court
jurisdiction.127 Judge Kaufman held that "deliberate torture perpetrated under color
of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international law of
human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an
alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our borders, §
1350 provides federal junsdiction."' 28 Overruling the lower court on another
matter, Judge Kaufman stated that courts "must interpret international law not as it
was in 1789 but as it has evolved and exists today among the nations of the world
today ,,029 On remand, Pefla-Irala took no part in the case, and the court awarded
punitive damages of $5 million each to Filartiga and his daughter. 130 The
judgment was never collected. 131
In the past two decades Filartigahas been used as a point of reference in over
one hundred cases and ATCA has been utilized in several dozen U.S. human rights
actions. 132 Nevertheless, it is still unclear how useful ATCA is or will be in
enforcing international human rights claims. A straightforward concern, for
example, continues to be the difficulty collecting damage awards. 33 In addition, it
is not yet clear how heavily federal courts will burden ATCA-based human rights
122. Id.
123. Id. at 878-79.
124. Id.at 879.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127 Id. at 878.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 881. See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Judge
Kaufman's statement in Filartiga).
130. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 1049 (2d

ed. 2000).
131. Id.
132. See id., see also Beth Stephens, Taking Pride in InternationalHuman Rights Litigation, 2 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 485, 485 (2001) (providing the numbers of ATCA cases).
133. See Charles Curlett, Introductory Remarks-Alien Tort Claims Act, international Law
Weekend Proceedings, ILSA J. INT'L & COMp L. 273, 274 (2000). "Although [ATCA litigation has]
generated two billion dollars in damage awards, none has been collected. Id., Shinn Sinnar, Book
Note, Torture as Tort: Comparative Perspectives on the Development of Transnational Human Rights
Litigation, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 331, 332 (2002) (noting on the subject of ATCA law suits that while
"obtaining redress from perpetrators is often cited as an objective of transnational human nghts cases,
few claimants actually receive compensation even after favorable judgment").
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claims under a range of judicial doctrines prompted by litigation of international
matters. Judges have found international comity, forum non conveniens, sovereign
immunity and the act of state, color of law (or state 34
action), and political question
doctrines relevant to consideration of ATCA claims. 1
C. Judge Bork v. The Alien Tort Claims Act
Despite the documentary and indirect evidence available regarding the
original purposes of ATCA, Judge Robert Bork, in a concurrence to the 1984 per
curiam Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic decision, contended that Congress in
1789 had been unaware of the changing nature of the law of nations.135 Therefore,
Judge Bork insisted that Congress intended ATCA to concern only acts that were
in violation of the law of nations in 1789 136 Judge Bork's position has not been
supported in the courts. 137 In line with the history presented in sub-section A, the
modern scholarly and judicial consensus is that the law of nations is changeable,
and that Congress understood this in 1789.13g
Judge Bork also asserted that the statute provided only a grant ofjunsdiction,
meaning that ATCA claimants would have to find a cause of action elsewhere for
any claim that had not been understood to have a cause of action attached in 1789
139Dodge rejects this position as "patently antihistorical,"' 14 continuing
directlyThe very notion of an express cause of action did not appear until 1848 - nearly
sixty years after Congress passed the Alien Tort Clause. In 1789, it was
understood that the common law provided the right to sue for a tort in violation14 1of
the law of nations, just as it provided the right to sue for any other kind of tort.

In addition, as is nearly explicit in sub-section A, ATCA s original purpose
and intent were to grant foreigners the right to sue for tort claims in federal courts,

134. See generally John Haberstroh, In re World War 11 Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation and
Obstacles to International Human Rights Claims in U.S. Courts, 10 ASIAN L.J. 253 (2003) (discussing
ATCA in the context of Japanese forced labor litigation); Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights
Against Multinational Corporations under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems,
50 AM. J. COMP L. 493 (2002) (discussing claims against multinational corporations under ATCA).
However, an examination of these obstacles falls outside of the scope of this paper.
135. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774, 810-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 816. Dodge describes this position as "demonstrably incorrect. Dodge 1,supra note 3,
at 240-41.
137 See id.
138. Dodge refers to this as the prevailing view. Dodge 1,supra note 3, at 223; see also Kadic, 70
F.3d 232, 239.
139. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). ("[Ilt is essential that there be an
explicit grant of cause of action before a private plaintiff be allowed to enforce principles of
international law in a federal tribunal."). Judge Blackstone stated, in the late 18th Century, that "The
principal offences against the law of nations
are of three kinds: 1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2.
Infringement of the rights of embassadors Isicl]; and, 3. Piracy.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 68, quoted in Dodge 1,
supra note 3, at 226.
140. Dodge I, supra note 3, at 237.
141. Id. at 237-38.
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and early use of the statute actuated this understanding.142 The judicial consensus
is that a cause of action is implicit in ATCA. Doe v 43Unocal's Ninth Circuit has
agreed, finding that ATCA provided a cause of action.
In contrast to Bork's apparent understanding of the statute, ATCA is most
accurately understood as "merely" allowing an already existing substantive right of
action to be exercised in a new venue, the federal courts. 144 For example, Filartiga
read ATCA "not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as opening the federal
' 45
courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international law.'
ATCA, after all, was not a replacement for, but only added to a common law right
of action already available in state courts. 146 The state courts today still have
concurrent jurisdiction with the federal circuit over tort claims advanced by noncitizens and can also deal with torts in violation of international law 147 This right
under international law to make a tort claim in state courts arose in the colonial era,
not from state statutes but from the incorporation of the law of nations into state
law, through the inclusion of the law of nations in the American colonies' common
law. 148
In sum, Judge Bork's position is weak in scholarship, and the revival of
ATCA as an instrument advancing international human rights is solidly compatible
with the statute's original purposes and the Founders' understanding of the law of
nations. In this light, it would be a shame if an aggressively conservative Supreme
Court, if it were to review Unocal III, decided to demolish this human rights
weapon. The loss might be especially bitter since the entry point for Supreme
142. See Burley, supra note 28, at 463. See generally Dodge I, supra note 3; Anthony D'Amato,
What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously Mistaken,
79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985).
143. See Unoca 111, 2002 WL 31063976 at 8; Unocal If, I 10 F Supp. 2d at 1303.
144. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 887 See also Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780 n.5 (Edwards, J., concurring)
(referring to the passage from Filartigacited in the text, Edwards stated, "I construe this phrase to mean
that aliens granted substantive rights under international law may assert them under § 1350. This
conclusion
results in part from the noticeable absence of any discussion in Filartiga on the question
whether international law granted a right of action.").
145. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780.
146. District court jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Clause was "concurrent with the courts of the

several States, or thecircuit courts, as the case may be

Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, I Stat. 73, 77

(1789) (now § 1350), cited in Dodge 1, supra note 3, at 224 n. 100.

147. See D'Amato, supranote 35, at 65.
148. "[Tlhe law of nations
is
adopted in it's [sic] full extent by the common law, and is held
to be part of the law of the land. Dodge 1,supra note 3, at 232 (quoting, 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARY 67); Jay, supra note 35, at 824-25 (stating that American revolutionaries considered it a
"fundamental article of faith that the colonists were entitled to the protection of the common law
In the early years of the American Republic, federal judges, leading political figures, and commentators
commonly stated that the law of nations was part of the law of the United States."). Partly in answer to
the contention that ATCA establishes only federal jurisdiction and not cause of action, Dodge stated
that in early post-revolutionary America:
[V]iolations of the law of nations were widely recognized as common-law crimes
[and torts] were the civil counterparts of crimes
The important point is that in 1789
neither crimes nor torts in violation of the law of nations required positive legislation to
be actionable; both were cognizable at common law.
Dodge 1,supra note 3, at 232.
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Court involvement may turn out to be an ostensibly mundane but so far intractable
task: working out a third-party liability standard to apply to Unocal's misbehavior.
IV DOE V. UNOCAL SOURCES THIRD-PARTY COMPLICITY

A. Three Decisions in Search of a Standard
Generally, the Doe v Unocal decisions have dealt with the third-party liability
standard by considering it a reverse "state action' or "color of law" issue.' 49 Under
this view, the liability of Unocal depends on whether its conduct meets some
standard for complicity with the state's first-party tortssO In an alien tort claim,
meeting such a standard triggers tort liability- it also triggers classification of
Unocal's "private-party" acts as state action, usually a necessary element of a
customary international law violation.151
Looked at as a whole, Doe v. Unocal is a muddle on how to find and establish
the liability (or complicity) standard. For example, as the following brief overview
illustrates, each of the three decisions, in its re-analysis of the complicity issue, has
incorporated new sources of law. The plaintiffs won an initial victory in Unocal I:
the 1997 decision relied on § 1983 "color of law" doctrine to develop a complicity
standard for Unocal's conduct. 52 Unocal 11 reversed the earlier decision in
2000153 (in part, incidentally, because there was a heavier legal burden on the
plaintiffs154). Unocal H also employed § 1983 doctrine, but dismissed the action
because the private and public defendants did not share a common unlawful
goal.' 55 Innovatively, the decision enlisted relevant Nuremberg Tribunals
decisions to support its third-party liability standard. 156 Two years later, Unocal III
overruled Unocal 1 1 57 While it agreed with consulting Nuremberg tribunal
decisions, it rejected Unocal Irs readings of them.i58 Unocal Ill's innovation was
to give standard-setting weight to decisions by two recently formed ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, the International Cnminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 59
149. Unoca 11, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1305.
150. Id.
151. However, there are exceptions to the state action requirement. See Unoca 11, 110 F Supp. 2d
at 1305 (stating "the law of nations has historically been applied to private actors for the crimes of
piracy and slave trading, and for certain war crimes."); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-44 (removing the state
actor requirement from genocide and war crimes).
152. Unocal/, 963 F Supp. at 890-91.
153. Unocal 11, i10F Supp. 2dat 1312.
154. See Shaw, supra note 30, at 1372 (explaining that the Unocal I judge "dealt with the case
dunng Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, and he allowed the plaintiffs to proceed.
Later, however, [the Unocal H judge] considered the claim as part of the more stnngent standard for
summary judgment.").
155. Unocal ll, 110 F Supp. 2dat 1306-07.
156. Id. at 1309-10.
157 Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 at 84.
158. Id. at 10.
159. Id. at 12-13.
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Finally, a February 2003 Ninth Circuit order set aside Unocal III for en banc
review, and again returned to the third-party liability issue, indicating it would
address the disagreement between the Unocal III majority and concurring opinions
over which standard to use.' 6°
As noted, the Doe v. Unocal decisions have focused on the state action
question, but one with a reversed causation of the usual state action analysis. In
this regard, both Unocal I and II used the joint action test, one of four federal
common law tests sanctioned by the Supreme Court for determining whether
private action is sufficiently connected with official acts to trigger private liability
for action "under color of law ,161 The joint action test asks whether private
parties and complicit state officials have acted "in concert" to effect a deprivation
of constitutional rights. 162 Courts find state action where there is a "substantial
degree of cooperative action" between state and private actors in the deprivation of
constitutional rights. 163
In Unocal I, plaintiffs alleged that Unocal and state officials were jointly
engaged in forced labor and other human rights violations in furtherance of the
pipeline project.16 The court agreed, and decided the allegations were sufficient to
support subject-matter jurisdiction under ATCA. 6 Notably however, during its
review of court decisions related to joint action, Unocal I commented that "some
courts have found that the joint action test requires that the state and private actors
'share a common, unconstitutional goal." ' " 66 It was this lack of a shared
unconstitutional goal between Unocal and the Myanmar military that would be
central to the Unocal II reversal of the earlier decision. 167
The Unocal I decision also found the Second Circuit's 1995 Kadic decision
instructive. 168 Kadic innovatively made use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "color of law"
jurisprudence in order to classify private party human rights violations in the
former Yugoslavia as state action. Color of law jurisprudence had first been
employed in the civil rights era to challenge, as state action, nominally private
deprivations of civil rights. 169 Kadic explained that color of law extends the
160. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir.
Feb. 14, 2003) (en banc hearing order).
161. See Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1995) (identifying the four
tests as nexus, state compulsion, public function, and joint action).
162. Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1453 (10th Cir. 1995).
163. Id.at1454.
164. Unocal l, 963 F Supp. at883.
165. Unocall,963 F Supp. at891.
166. Id.(quoting Cunningham v. Southlake Ctr. for Mental Health, Inc., 924 F.2d 106, 107 (7th
Cir. 1991)).
167. See Unocal II, Il0 F Supp. 2d at 1306-10.
168. Unocal 1, 963 F Supp at 890.
169. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (finding a basis for relief under §
1983 when a police officer and employee of private firm "reached an understanding" to violate
plaintiff's
constitutional rights);
United States v.Price, 383 U.S. 787 794 n.7 (1966) (stating "Incases
under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the
'state
action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment"). See also Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d
1145, 1148 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding that the Supreme Court had made distinction between the color of
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liability associated with state action to any individual who "acts together with state
officials or with significant state aid."'170 For such an individual the § 1983
jurisprudence "is a relevant guide to whether a defendant has engaged in official
action for purposes of jurisdiction under [ATCA]."'' 7
Unocal I was cheered as a substantial victory for human rights abuse victims
because it recognized a "'knew or should have known' theory against a corporation
that 'looked the other way' and benefited from atrocious acts."' 172 Human rights
advocates' hopes were of course deflated by Unocal H.1 73 A critical difference
from Unocal I was Unocal Is more demanding interpretation of the joint action
test. 174In order to classify their acts as state action, the court held that corporations
must do more than benefit from state wrongdoing. 75 Specifically, corporations
must conspire or participate with the state in the violations of international law and
exercise control over the actions of the state. 176 Working from the § 1983 case
law, the court stated:
In order for a private individual to be liable for a § 1983 violation when the state
actor commits the challenged conduct, the plaintiff must establish that the private
individual was the proximate cause of the violation.
In order to establish
proximate cause, a plaintiff must prove that the private individuals exercised
control over the government official's decision to commit the section 1983

violation. 177
The Nuremberg Tribunal characterizations of joint action and complicity also
underpin the Unocal H understanding of the joint action test. 78 According to the
court, Nuremberg rested its guilty verdicts in several trials of industrialists who
had used Third Reich slave labor "not on the defendants' knowledge and
acceptance of benefits of the forced labor, but on their active participation in the
unlawful conduct."' 79 In fact, the tribunal acquitted defendants who had not
law and state action concepts).
170. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245.
171. Id.
172. John Christopher Anderson, Respecting Human Rights: Multinational Corporations Strike
Out, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP L. 463, 500 (2000).
173. See, e.g., Maria Ellinikos, American MNCs Continue to Profitfrom the Use of Forced and
Slave Labor Begging the Question: Should America Take Cue from Germany? 35 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 1, 12 ("As the Unocal case law reveals, alllegal
efforts to provide relief for the forced
laborers in Burma thus far remain fruitless.").
174. Unocal I1,
110 F Supp. 2d at 1305-06; Unocal 1, 963 F Supp. at 890 (citing Dennis v. Sparks,
449 U.S. 24,27 (1980)).
175. See Unocal 1I, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1305-06.
176. Id. at 1305-07
177. Id. at 1307 (citing King v. Massarweh,782 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1986)).
178. Unocal 1l,
iOF Supp. 2dat 1309-10.
179. Id. at 1310. Unocal III rejected application of this standard:
The Distnct Court incorrectly borrowed the "active participation" standard for liability
from war crimes cases before Nuremberg Military Tribunals involving the role of
German industrialists in the Nazi forced labor program dunng the Second World War.
The Military Tribunals applied the "active participation" standard in these cases only to
overcome the defendants' "necessity defense.
In the present case, Unocal did not
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exercised initiative in acquiring forced labor.18 0 Examining Unocal's actions, the
Unocal II court agreed that the evidence suggested that the corporation knew
forced labor was being used and that it was benefiting from its use.'8 Guided by
Nuremberg, however, the court ruled that such a showing did not establish liability
under international
law, since Unocal had not actively sought the use of forced
82
labor. 1
Commentators on Unocal 11 have criticized its use of the joint action test and
its "active participation" standard, citing several international tribunal decisions'

less stringent tests for classification of private party acts as state action.' 8 3 Notably
undemanding was the standard in Prosecutor v. Tadic,84 where the Appeals

Chamber of the ICTY dealt, in a prosecution appeal of a trial court judgment, i85
with ascription of responsibility to a state for a private (paramilitary) group's acts
on its behalf'18 6 Tadic found that individual action could be under color of law
without substantial state involvement. 87 Specifically, "when a State entrusts a
private individual (or group of individuals) with the specific task of performing
lawful actions on its behalf, but then the individuals, in discharging that task,
breach an international obligation of the State, state action can be found without
substantial participation by the state in the non-state actors' international law
violations. 1S In such a case, "by analogy with the rules concerning State
responsibility for acts of State officials acting ultra vires, Tadic asserted that the
state becomes responsible for the private individuals' acts with the specific request
to act on the state's behalf. i89
However, what about the reverse 9 Would private individuals, such as the Doe
invoke - and could not have invoked - the necessity defense.
Unoca 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 37 The Nuremberg tribunal, the court noted, defined the
necessity defense as follows: "Necessity is a defense when it is shown that the act charged was done to
avoid an evil both serious and irreparable; that there was no other adequate means of escape; and that
the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil. Id. at 37 n.21 (quoting United States v. Krupp, 9
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10,
1436 (1950). The court also stated that a reasonable fact finder might find Unocal liable even if the
"active participation" standard were applied. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 38 n.22.
180. Unocall1, 110 F Supp. 2d at 1310.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Craig Forcese, ATCA's Achilles Heel, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 487, 508 (2001). See generally
Brad J. Kieserman, Comment, Profits and Principles: Promoting Multinational Corporate
Responsibility by Amending the Alien Tort Claims Act, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1999) (criticizing
the rejection by multinational corporations of responsibility "for the abusive conduct of their foreign
host governments.").

184. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, No. ICTY-94-I-A (July 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Tadic 1999].

Unocal III applied Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-I-T (May 7 1997)

(Opinion and Judgment) [hereinafter Tadic 1997] and several other ICTY cases in its analysis of Unocal
complicity. See Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12.
185. Tadic 1997 supranote 184.
186. Tadic 1999, supranote 184, at 97
187 id.at 119.
188. Id.

189 Id. Ultra vires refers to actions "beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by law.
1525 (7th ed. 1999).
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v. Unocal defendants, become responsible for state acts if they had specifically
requested the state to act on their behalf? Only such reversed causation would
seem to make the Tadic scenario apply to Doe v. Unocal. However, the question
has in effect already been answered: Unocal I had reversed the third and first party
roles, finding the complicit private party liable, and under color of law, for the
state's first-party acts.190 In fact, one commentator has suggested ATCA decisions
are "evidently very comfortable" using state action doctrine to attach liability for
state acts to complicit private parties.i 91
Unocal III employed an updated version of the Tadic test. 192 Specifically the
court made use of another ICTY case, Prosecutorv. Furundzta,'93 importing most
of its aiding and abetting actus reus standard, which required "practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration
4
of the crime."'19
Unocal III then returned to the 1997 Tadic trial chamber decision
to clarify when the accomplice's acts have the required "substantial effect on the
perpetration of the crime."' 95 The effect is substantial, the court stated, when "the
criminal act most probably would not have occurred in the same way [without]
someone act[ing] in the role that the [accomplice] in fact assumed."' 196
For the mens rea aiding and abetting standard, Unocal III again turned to
Furundztja, which held the requirement to be constructive (i.e., a reasonable
person's) or actual "knowledge that [the accomplice's] actions will assist the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime."' 97 Further, "it is not necessary for the
accomplice to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, in the sense of positive
intention to commit the crime."'' 98 Finally, the aider and abettor is not required to
know the precise crime the principal intends to commit. 99 Instead, if the
accomplice "is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be committed,
and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to facilitate the
commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor. ''200 Unocal III
came close to declaring its "Furundzya standard" the current criterion for aiding
and abetting liability under international law 201

190. Unocall,963 F Supp. at 891.
19 i. See Forcese, supra note 183, at 498.
192. See Unocal 11, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12-16.
193. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, ICTY-95-17/I-T (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999),
quoted in Unocal Ill,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12.
194. Id.at 209.
195. Id.
196. Unocal 111,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12, (quoting Tadic 1997 supra note 184, 688).
197 Furundzya, ICTY-95-17/1 -T at 245, quoted in Unocal Ill,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at
12.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. The concurrence accused the majonty of this. Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 30
(Reinhardt, J., concurring). The majority disagreed. Id. at 12. The majonty wntes that, "with respect
to practical assistance and encouragement, these [ICTY and ICTR] decisions accurately reflect the
current standard for aiding and abetting under international law as it pertains to the ATCA. Id.at 1213 (internal quotations omitted).
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Unocal III declared that applying the criminal tribunal test in a tort action is
not problematic, since the international criminal standard is similar enough to the
domestic tort law aiding and abetting standard. 0 2 It derived the latter from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1979): "For harm resulting to a third person from
the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he
(b) knows that
the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself. 20 3 Note, however, that the
standard adopted by Unocal III gives no weight to the last four words of the
preceding quotation, "so to conduct himself," if those words mean that a mens rea
aiding and abetting element is an intent to encourage or assist the first party's
specific breach of duty
In sum, Unocal III derived from Furundzya both its actus reus aiding and
abetting requirement - "practical assistance or encouragement which has a
substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime of, in the present case, forced
labor ' '2°4 - and its mens rea requirement - "actual or constructive (i.e., reasonable)
knowledge that the accomplice's actions will assist the perpetrator in the
commission of the crime. 20 5
As will be discussed in the following section, the Unocal III concurrence
disagreed with the majority's third-party aiding and abetting standard because it
rejected its sources of law. In brief, the concurrence would reject the standards
developed from "evolving standards -of international law, such as a nascent
criminal law doctrine recently adopted by an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal, 20 6 and instead would develop a liability rule from federal common law
principles.20 7 The principles of agency, joint venture, and reckless disregard are
well established in the federal common law, the concurrence states, "and disputed
questions of fact exist with respect to each. 20 8 Thus, like the majority, the
concurrence found the plaintiffs were entitled to go to trial. 209
The concurrence is one indication that Unocal III has not finally settled the
third-party liability issue, especially regarding its sources of law, and the February
202. Id. at 13.
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979) § 876, quoted in Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19263, at 13.
204. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 14. The concurrence criticized the court for
being inconsistent because it excluded the Furundzyja sub-element, "moral support, from its actus reus:

[B]y substituting international law standards for federal common law, rather than
following federal common law and incorporating those portions of international law that
attract sufficient legal support, the majority has lost whatever opportunity it had to pick
and choose the aspects of international law that it finds appealing. Having declared that

international law governs, and that the Yugoslav Tribunal's standard constitutes the
controlling international law, the majority cannot then escape the implications of being
bound by the law it has selected.
Id. at 30 n.9 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 15.

206. Id. at 26.
207 Id.

208. Id. at 30.
209. Id.
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2003 Ninth Circuit order for an en banc review is another. 21 That order indicates
the en banc panel will closely consider the concurrence and majority liability
standard disagreement. 21 Beyond the en banc review, the Supreme Court may
await its chance to speak on the issue.
B. Unocal Il's Choice of Law Confusion
I Introduction
The Doe v. Unocaljudges have experienced conflict of law difficulties, or at
least that is one way to explain the several incarnations of the liability standard
throughout the litigation. The conflicting analyses of the choice of law issue by
the Unocal 11Imajority and concurrence may help to illustrate the problem. Both
look to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, 21 2 as Ninth Circuit
precedent inssts. 21 3 The seven restatement factors are as follows:
(1) [T~he needs of the interstate and international systems[,] (2) the relevant
policies of the forum, (3) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue; (4) the
protection of justified expectations, (5) the basic policies underlying the particular
field of law, (6) certainty, predictability and uniformity of214result, and (7) ease in
the determination and application of the law to be applied.
The majority concluded that the above factors compel it to apply international
law generally, and specifically the third-party liability standards derived from the
Nuremberg, ICTY and ICTR international criminal tribunals. The majority
maintained its choice was favored by factors (1), (4), (5), (6), and (7) above, and
found factor (2) at worst neutral.2 5 Specifically, regarding factor (1), it stated that
the needs of the international system are best served by applying an international
standard for aiding and abetting.216 Regarding factor (2), the majority found the
forum has no settled standard to disturb, so the adoption of the international
tribunal-based standard will not upset existing forum policy 217 Factor (5),
advancing the underlying policy of the concerned field of law, also favored
international law 218 The underlying policy which the majority determined is "to
provide tort remedies for violations of international law, is best served by
international law. 219 Finally, regarding factors (4), (6), and (7), the majority stated
210. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 2716 (9th Cir., Feb. 14, 2003).
211. See generally Koh, supra note 7 (discussing the June en banc hearing).
212. Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263.
213. See In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 277 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that "[flederal
choice of law rules follow the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.").
214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 at 10 (1971).
215. Unocal I11,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 11.
216. Id.
217 Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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that the standard it adopted, "from an admittedly recent case, nonetheless reached
back at least to the Nuremberg tribunal and was similar to the standard set down in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.220
The concurrence decided instead for application of a third-party liability
standard grounded in federal common law principles. 21 It stated that factors (2),
(4), (5), (6), and (7) favor application of federal common law regarding third-party
liability, and found factors (1) and (3) neutral, if not also favoring federal common
law 222 Regarding factor (2), the concurrence stated the forum's relevant policy
was creation of a federal forum "where courts may fashion domestic common law
remedies" for torts in violation of customary international law 223 On the
protection of justified expectations, factor (4), the concurrence maintained those
expectations would be limited, since no Ninth Circuit direct precedent existed for
third-party ATCA liability 224 That said, the federal common law principles of
agency joint-venture liability and reckless disregard were well known and
regularly applied in many contexts, while the tribunal standard was new and the
nature of tribunals made their law unsettled. 225 As for factor (5), the policy
underlying the field of law is to provide "an appropriate tort remedy" for
customary international law violations and "[t]he application of third-party liability
standards generally applicable to tort cases directly furthers the basic policy of
using tort law to redress international wrongs., 226 Regarding factor (6), the
concurrence predicted that future decisions' "certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result" would be enhanced by the wealth of precedent available in
federal common law and by independence from "the future decisions of some asyet unformed international tribunal established to deal with other unique regional
conflicts. '227 Finally, the concurrence concluded that the well-developed federal
common law is most compatible with factor (7), "ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied., 228 The concurrence found the remaining
choice-of-law factors, (1) and (3), "neutral, at the least, and certainly not contrary
to the use of federal common law 229
2. Against the Concurrence's Federal Common Law Approach
Both the majority and concurrence analyses pointed out the central weakness
in the other side's choice of law The choice of law by the concurrence, for
example, appears to reduce an ATCA tort to what the majority termed "a garden-

220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 28 (Reinhardt, J., concurmng) (quoting Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (I lth
Cir. 1996)).
224. Unocal III, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS i9263, at 28.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227 Id.
228. Id.
229 Id.
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variety municipal tort., 2 30 This resulted from treating the statute as "essentially a
jurisdictional grant only, and then looking to domestic tort law for the cause of
action. 23' In other words, the concurrence, in part, determined whether there was
an ATCA cause of action from "the internal law of a nation as opposed to
international law. 232 Making such a determination from municipal law disserves
the emerging international human rights regime. For example, one scholar has
maintained, if judges worldwide are to build "an enduring jurisprudence of
international human rights law, it will be because those norms converge from
adjudications in multiple jurisdictions each reflecting the socio-political structures
of its constitution, while seeking to conform local practices to evolving
international standards. 233
Yet, the concurrence's interpretation is permitted by the wording of ATCA,
since that statute does not declare what law should determine matters ancillary to
the primary one of finding a tort in violation of international law This paper
simply argues that an alternative reading, based on common sense and an equally
accurate understanding of the purposes and objectives of the statute, should
override the concurrence's interpretation. In this regard, recall first that the
statute's general objective was to bring the law of nations under sway of the
federal judiciary In addition, note that ATCA refers to a jurisdictional grant alone
simply because a grant of a cause of action was assumed, under the widespread
late 18th Century understanding that a cause of action was already available
through the incorporation of natural law into federal and state common law.
Therefore, the law of nations marks out the character of the cause of action. From
this perspective, to find Unocal potentially liable with a third-party standard less
stringent than that of international law, as I believe the concurrence did, allows
ATCA to stray far from its focus, the violation of norms commanding the world's
"general assent. 234
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case quoted
earlier in this section, also exposes difficulties in the concurrence's position.235 In
an effort to establish a federal remedy that would "give effect to violations of
customary international law," 236 Abebe-Jira states, it would be incongruous to use
the same statute to provide remedies for violations of federal common law alone.
Rather, at the first opportunity, when the decision on a grant of jurisdiction is
made, customary international law and its substantive standards should control
regarding the alleged acts of all defendants, including those facing allegations of
complicity.

230. Unocal III, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at I I (quoting Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F Supp.
162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995) (internal quotations omitted)).
231. Id.
232. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 831 (7th ed. 1999).
233. M.O. Chibundu, Making Customary InternationalLaw through Municipal Adjudication: A
Structural Inquiry, 39 VA.J. INT'L L. 1069, 1148 (1999).
234. Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881 (quoting Habana, 175 U.S. at 694).
235. Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 848.

236. Id.

DENV J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 32:2

As indicated earlier, the concurrence argued that federal common law should
be drawn from to establish a third-party liability standard, because that matter is
"ancillary" rather than substantive. 237 The concurrence correctly understood as
substantive the tort itself, and understood as ancillary that which does not create or
define the first party's acts.
However, another understanding is that "substantive law" is "the part of the
law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and the powers of the
parties," 238 not merely the first party From this perspective, the liability standard
As even the concurrence agrees,
for the third party is substantive law
239
international law should interpret "the substantive component of the ATCA.,
As a matter of common sense, of course, the liability standard has been far more
than subordinate or ancillary- at every step of the litigation it has been singularly
critical in determining whether the case is dismissed or goes forward.240
In summary, while ATCA explicitly grants federal courts jurisdiction over
torts in violation of customary international law, the natural law that already had
"granted" the statute's cause of action was concerned only with violations of
international law, for example violations by third parties of rights and duties
derived from international law. The statute was not meant to allow federal
jurisdiction over parties in violation only of municipal law, and courts should bar
any wider application of the statute. 24' Therefore, courts should not apply a federal
common law standard to third party wrongs.
3. Against the Majority's International Tribunal Approach
The majority was right to reject the use of federal common law for
determining a liability rule and properly found the standard in international law.
However, the majority erred in where it looked for the international standard. The
concurrence justly derided the majority's use of a third-party liability rule only
recently generated by the ICTY 242
The standard set down by that tribunal was peculiarly broad, as seen in
several paragraphs of the 1997 Tadic decision, spelling out the Unocal 1Il
standard:
The Trial Chamber finds that aiding and abetting includes all acts of assistance by words
or acts that lend encouragement or support, as long as the requisite intent is present.
[if] presence can be shown or inferred, by circumstantial or other
Under this theory,
evidence, to be knowing and to have direct and substantial effect on the commission of

237 Unoca 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 27 (Reinhardt, J., concumng) (stating that there
is no "reason to apply international law to the question of third-party liability simply because
international law applies to the substantive violation; as discussed above, federal common law is
").
properly invoked when the statute at issue leaves an ancillary question unanswered
238. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1161, (7th ed. 1999).
239. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 27.
240. In UnocalI, HI and III, the liability issue decided whether the plaintiffs' case would go forward
or be dismissed. See supraPart IV.A-B.
241. See infra Part IV.C.

242. Unocal II1, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 24 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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the illegal act, then it is sufficient on which to base a finding of participation and assign
the criminal culpability that accompanies it. Moreover, when an accused is present and
participates in the beating of one person and remains with the group when it moves on to
beat another person, his presence would have an encouraging effect, even if he does not
physically take part in this second beating, and he should be viewed as participating in
this second beating as well. However, actual physical presence when the crime is
committed 24is3 not necessary[, but] the acts of the accused must be direct and
substantial.

This standard was "legally suspect" even for Michael Scharf, a prominent
ICTY 'insider' and a Tadic judgment supporter.2" More evidence is needed in the
United States to find criminal liability for aiding and abetting. 245 "For a
conviction, there must be proof that the defendant either physically assisted the
perpetrator in the commission of the crime, stood by with intent (known to the
perpetrator) to render aid if needed, or that he commanded, counseled, or otherwise
encouraged the perpetrator to commit the crime." 2
Moreover, absent
"contributing actual aid, criminal liability cannot lie unless the bystander's
approval is manifested by some word or act, such that it affects the mind of the
perpetrator., 247 The "encouragement" element of the Tadic standard, for example,
is reminiscent of the prosecution's proposed standard in what Scharf calls, "the
infamous Big Dan's rape trial, 248 later the subject of a popular movie, The
Accused. In that trial, the prosecutor's theory was that cheering bystanders had
contributed to the crime of rape. Defendants were acquitted of charges resting on

that theory

249

To develop an encouragement standard, the ICTY has made overly restrictive
surveys ofjudicial decisions to discover applicable international law, concentrating
almost exclusively on Nazi-era military tribunal cases. 250 In Tadic, for example,
Nazi-era war crimes and crimes against humanity decisions are the only cases
looked at in its examination of the aiding and abetting issue.251 Specifically, the
decision's "Required extent of participation" section first discusses the Nuremberg

243. Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 689-91.
244. Michael P Scharf, Trial and Error-An Assessment of the First Judgment of the Yugolavia
War Crimes Tribunal, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 167, 200 (1998) ("In short, viewed through
American eyes, justice was done in [Tadic 1997], though it could have been done better."). Scharf is
co-author of a guide to the inner workings of the ICTY cited for guidance in Tadic 1997 supra note
184, at 536. Virginia Mors and Michael P Scharf, An Insider Guide to the InternationalCriminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia (1995) [hereinafter Scharf, An Insider's Guide). Scharf has also
written an account of Tadic 1997 MICHAEL P SCHARF BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE
FIRST INTERNATIONAL WARCRIMEs TRIAL SINCE NUREMBURG (1997).
245. ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 724 (3d ed.

1982), cited in Scharf,
An Insider Guide, supra note 244, at 190.
246. Scharf, supra note 244, at 190.
247 Id. (citing PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 244, at 742).
248. Scharf, supra note 244, at 188. The decision is Commonwealth v. Viera, 519 N.E.2d 1320
(Mass. 1987). The case was later the subject of a well-known movie, The Accused (U1P/Paramount,
1988).
249. See Ruth Marcus, Other Defendants Acquitted; 2 More Convicted in Barroom Rape, WASH.
POST, Mar. 23, 1984, at Al, cited in Scharf, supra note 244, at 190.
250. Id.
25 1. Tadic 1997, supranote 184, at 682-87
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Tribunal's Dachau case, noting that its third element of required proof is that the
accused had to have "encouraged, aided and abetted, or participated" in enforcing
252
that notorious Nazi concentration camp's systematic deprivations and cruelties.
This is the last time in the sub-section that the court refers to the encouragement
notion. In the next paragraph, Tadic discusses another Nuremberg concentration
camp case, the Mauthausen case, which concerned the practice of mass
extermination in gas chambers. 253 That court understandably employed a
remarkably broad extent of participation standard:
That any official, governmental, military or civil
or any guard or civil
employee, in any way in control of or stationed at or engaged in the operation of
the Concentration Camp Mauthausen, or any or all of its by-camps in any manner
whatsoever, is guilty of a 254
crime against the recognized laws, customs and
practices of civilized nations.
The next paragraph of the Tadic survey concerns an Auschwitz commander's
conviction as an accessory to the murder of 750 individuals, based on his
involvement in "procuring Zyklon B gas, constructing gas ovens, arranging for
trucks to transport inmates to the gas chambers, and alerting the camp bureaucracy
as to the imminent amval of transports., 25 5 The following paragraph cites another
World War 1Iwar crimes tribunal case, in which the British Military Court found
the defendants guilty because they "knew that they were going to the woods for the
purpose of killing the victims, and therefore the defendants engaged in a common
unlawful enterprise.256 Moreover, the defendant who "stayed in the car to prevent
strangers from disturbing the two who were engaged m killing the victims" did not
escape culpability 257 The next case involved the brutalization and killing of
downed WWII U.S. pilots by civilians while they were paraded through the streets
of a German town. 258 Guards who stood by during the lynching and the official
who ordered the parade were among the convicted. 259 Finally, two more World
War 11cases are cited, these before a French military tribunal. From Gustav
Becker Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others, 260 Ferrarese,261 and several other cases, the
Tadic court derives the accused-unfriendly principal that "not only does one not
have to be present but the connection between the act contributing to the
252. Id. at 1 682 (citing II UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
13 (London, 1949) [hereinafter LAW REPORTS])

LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS

OF WAR CRIMINALS,

253. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 683.
254. Id. (citing LAW REPORTS, supra note 252, at 15).
255. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 683 (2 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES
CRIMES REPORTS

COMMISSION, WAR

48 (London, 1948).

256. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 685 (citing Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others, British
Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, held at the Court House, Almelo, Holland, on 24-26
Nov., 1945, Vol. I, Law Reports 35,43 (1947)).
257. Id.
258. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 687 (citing Case. no. 12-489, United States v. Kurt Goebellet
al., Report, Survey of the Trials of War Crimes Held at Dachau, Germany, 2-3 (Sept. 15, 1948)).
259. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 687.
260. Id.(citing Gustav Becker, Wilhelm Weber and 18 Others, Vol. V1i, LAW REPORTS 67 70).
261. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 687 (citing Ferrarese,Vol. Vii, LAW REPORTS 67, 81).
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commission and the act of commission itself can be geographically and temporally
distanced. 262
In the equivalent Furundzya sub-sections 263 (putting aside their references to
ICTY and ICTR decisions) only the same or similar trials are examined, all from
the Nuremberg tribunals or other courts whose concerns were Nazi-era
atrocities. 2 " Once again, support is sparse for the notion that encouragement alone
can constitute the mens rea of aiding and abetting. Support is found in only two
cases: in Dachau and in The Synagogue Case, decided by the German Supreme
Court in occupied Germany 265 The Synagogue court held that the status of the
accused as a "longtime militant of the Nazi party, along with his general
knowledge of the perpetrators' criminal enterprise, were enough to establish the
crime's mens rea element, even though the defendant had not planned, ordered, or
taken part in the crime against humanity, the destruction of a synagogue. 26
The exclusive focus on the Nazis and their atrocities is troubling, because it
would naturally be expected to generate a mens rea standard of culpability
appropnate only for such perpetrators of unmatched evil.267 As noted above, for
example, the Nazi-focused military tribunals was not adverse to establishing catchall standards that ensured that nearly any German with any coercive authority at
the Mauthausen concentration camp would be found guilty of a crime against
humanity 268 Recall in this respect how Furundzya's mens rea complicity standard
was too broad for the Unocal III majority, which refused to incorporate "moral
support" into its own standard.269
The tribunals for Nazi-era offenses and by the ICTY and ICTR have devised
such exceptional standards because of a perceived duty to convict large numbers of
individuals culpable in widespread outbreaks of extraordinary evil. 270 Genocide is
262. Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 687 (citing Vol. VII, LAW REPORTS 67, 70).
217-26 (Judgment) (Int'l Crim.
199-216,
263. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/l-T,
Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Trial Chamber Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999)
[hereinafter Furundzija].
264. Unocal II1recognized this, although it also described Furundzyja as undertaking "an
exhaustive analysis of international case law" in pursuit of its actus reus aiding and abetting standard:
"The international case law it considered consisted chiefly of decisions by American and British
military courts and tribunals dealing with Nazi war crimes, as well as German courts in the British and
French occupied zones dealing with such crimes in the aftermath of the Second World War. Unocal
111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 36 n.26. It is conceivable, of course, that all third-party liability
and aiding-and-abetting international case law has involved Nazi-era criminals.
265. Furundzia,supra note 263, at IM205-09 (citing the case at Strafsenat. Urteil vom 10. August
1948 gegen K. und A. StS 18/48 (Entscheidungen, Vol. i, pp. 53 and 56)).
266. Furundzija,supranote 263, at 209.
Gerry J. Simpson,
267 The Nazi regime is "the epitome of absolute evil in Western culture
Didacticand DissidentHistories in War Crimes Trials,60 ALB. L. REV. 801, 811 (1997).
268. See Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 683 (citing Vol. XI, Law Reports 13).
269. See note 204 and accompanying text.
270. See Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster- The Rights of the Accused and the
InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP 11I, 192 (1998)
("All of [the ICTY's] branches, including the judiciary, are slanted toward fulfilling the Security
Council mandate of achieving results: that means convictions not acquittals. As result, the ICTY in its
current incarnation cannot fairly adjudicate matters in a neutral and detached way."); see also Student
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the exemplar of such evil, and the creation of the ad hoc tribunals is commonly
understood as an attempt to put a stop to that atrocity 271 An innovative student
note in the 2001 Harvard Law Review, in fact, came right out and said what must
be on the mind of many a tribunal judge: that the disutility of acquitting a
genocidaire is a harm of an order of magnitude greater than the harm of freeing an
ordinary murderer.272 The writer then asked, "If the presumption of innocence
really reflects 'a rational world, should not the prosecutor's burden of persuasion
drop considerably in cases involving charges of genocide? ' 273 The ICTY may be
attempting to achieve that goal, in part, through the indirect means of standard274
setting.
Note, Developments in the Law: FairTrialsand the Role of InternationalCriminalDefense, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1982, 1995 (2001) [hereinafter Student Note]:
There is little credible evidence of bias for or against any of the ethnic or national groups
prominent at the tribunals as defendants or victims. There is somewhat more evidence of
a bias against defendants generally, including as critics have noted, the "prosecutorial
zeal" demonstrated by judges in public remarks regarding the need for the tribunals to
succeed.
Id.. See also Larry A. Hammond, Testimony of Larry A. Hammond Before the House International
Relations Committee, Feb. 28, 2002, available at http://www.osbommaledon.com/press/artcles/
hammond_testimonyhouse of rep.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (stating that the ICTY judges and
prosecutors are subject to "an always present pressure to gain convictions"). A former justice
department attorney, Hammond served on a 1993 ABA task force charged with recommending
procedural rules to the ICTY Id.
The contrast between ordinary crime and acts of extraordinary evil is considered in Miriam J.
Aukerman, ExtraordinaryEvil, OrdinaryCrime: A Frameworkfor UnderstandingTransitionalJustice,
15 HARV HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002). See also Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps, The InternationalTrial of
the Century? A "Cross-Fire Exchange on the FirstCase Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal,
29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 635, 642 (1996) (comparing the Serb-run concentration camps to the Nazi-run
World War 1Iconcentration camps).
271. See, e.g., Symposium: Telford Taylor Panel: CriticalPerspectives On The Nuremberg Trial,
12 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HuM. RTS. 453, 458 (1995). Panelist Ruti Teitel described the ad hoc tribunals'
origins as "current attempts in Yugoslavia and in Rwanda to stop genocide. Id. Panelist Jonathan
Bush noted the "new international tribunals established to try genocide in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Id. at 460.
272. Student Note, supra note 270, at 1992.
273. Id., see also Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalCriminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties
and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 111, 114 (2002) (describing that "[tihe extreme character of the
crimes alleged before international criminal courts makes the case for accountability stronger than in
domestic prosecutions.").
274. For comment on ICTY unfairness to the defense, see Matthew M. DeFrank, ICTY Provisional
Release: Current Practice,A Dissenting Voice, And the Casefor Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429,
1457 (2002) ("A growing body of academic literature has criticized the Tribunal for denying its accused
procedural protections necessary for fair trials."); Vincent M. Creta, The Search for Justice in the
Former Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statue andthe Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia, 20 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 381, 390-417 (1998); Student Note, supra note 270, at 1994-96. See also Simon Jenkins, The
New Order that Splits the World, LONDON TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, available at
http://www.casi.org.uk/discuss/2001/msgOO102.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (describing the
tribunal as "absurdly partisan").
Regarding bias during the trial of Milosevic, see John Laughland, If This Man Is a War Criminal,
Where Is All the Evidence? MAIL ON SUNDAY (London) 54, Aug. 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL
23304850 (Presiding Judge Richard May "has distinguished himself throughout the trial by his
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Ultimately, then, war crime trials and their standards are for "the Hitlers, the
Goerings, the Pol Pots, the Milosevics, the Karadzics, and other architects of
genocide
,275
Perhaps these trials should not be for "ordinary murderers, as
their multitudes of purposes may take precedence over the dispensation of justice
for matters of less-than-extraordinary evil. 6 Perhaps this also helps to explain
belligerence towards Milosevic and in particular for his habit of interrupting Milosevic, even sometimes

switching off his microphone, whenever the former Yugoslav leader's cross-examination shows up
inconsistencies in a witness's evidence."). It is also useful to look at the transcripts of the ICTY trials.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54, Trial Transcript,
9012-45 (Aug. 28, 2002),
available at http://www.milosevic-tnal.org/tnal/2002-08-28.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (describing
presiding Judge Richard May's obstructive and belligerent behavior toward Milosevic, and complete
permissiveness toward the witness, BBC reporter). Also note the lack of any response to Milosevic's
complaint about delivery of extensively revised witness testimony the night before the next witness's
testimony. Id. at 904445.
275. Davida E Kellogg, Jus Post Bellum: The Importance of War Crimes Trials, PARAMETERS,
Oct. 1, 2002, at 8799, available at 2002 WL 18222363. However, it is incongruous for Kellogg to
group Milosevic and Karadzic with Pol Pot and the Nazis; the evidence that those two are guilty of
genocide is sparse indeed. Nonetheless, the comment indicates that tribunals are set up in the wake of
perceptions of extraordinary evil. Regarding the absence of evidence against Milosevic, see Laughland,
infra note 283. The importance of Holocaust imagery in motivating the creation of the ICTY is
discussed in Freddric Mdgret, The Politics of International Criminal Justice, European Journal of
InternationalLaw, Feb. 09, 2003, available at http://ejil.org/joumalVVoll3/No5/brl-03.html. Megret
reviews seven books on the Balkan crisis, writing that all agree the decisive turn toward international
involvement came in the wake of 1992 media reports and images of Nazi-style concentration camps in
Bosnia. Regarding the Bosnia conflict, a senior BBC correspondent writes that "a climate was created
in which it was very hard to understand what was really going on, because everything came to be seen
through the filter of the Holocaust. JOHN SIMPSON, STRANGE PLACES, QUESTIONABLE PEOPLE 444-45
(1998).
276. For a practical view of the purposes of international criminal tribunals, see Antonio Cassese,
Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 61 MOD. L. REV. 1,1-6 (1998) (stating the principal aims
of tribunal justice are: I) distinguishing culpable perpetrators from others of the same ethnic or other
group, 2) dissipating calls for revenge by showing victims that perpetrators are being punished, 3)
fostering reconciliation by ensuring that perpetrators pay for the crimes, and 4) creating a reliable
record of past atrocities). Cassese is the former chief judge and President of the ICTY See Johnson,
supra note 270, at n.172.
Simpson, supra note 267 at 829, offers a theoretical discussion of war crimes tribunal purposes. One of
the functions described is legitimation:
[Tihere is a sense that war crimes trials, in revealing to us what war crimes are, also tell
us that other acts are not in this category. In this way, Nuremberg tells us that Nagasaki
was not a war crime and that the Soviet invasion of Finland in 1941 was not aggression.
Similarly, message of the [Klaus] Barbie trial is that torture in Algeria is not war
crime or that Vichy France was not as anti-Semitic as Nazi Germany.
Id. See also Joan Phillips, The Case Against War Crimes Tribunals, THE NATION, Feb. 1995, available
at http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/politics/myth/articles/feb95.JoanPhillips.htm (last visited Mar.
10, 2004) (stating that "[tihe concept of war crimes appears to be an ideological construction of New
World order politics, used to legitimize the international pecking order by branding some as criminals
and casting others in the role ofjudges.").
The ICTY tribunal may be functioning in such a manner, in particular after NATO's air war on
Yugoslavia appeared to violate laws of war. See Amnesty International, NATO/Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia "CollateralDamage or Unlawftl Killings? Violations of the Laws of War by NATO
During Operation Allied Force (2000) available at web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/EUR700182000 (last
visited Mar. 10, 2004); Andreas Laursen, NATO, The War Over Kosovo, And the ICTY Investigation,
17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 765 (2002). The legitimation purpose may also have been present in the
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why their standards diverge from the practice in U.S. criminal courts, as Michael
Scharf has confirmed. 27 Our federal courts, therefore, should draw back from and
reconsider applying ICTY and ICTR tribunal standards. Special rules for
conditions of absolute evil should not underpin generalized international law.
In addition to the general standard-setting problems of tribunals set up to deal
with outbreaks of extraordinary evil, the specific nature
and purpose of the ICTY
27 8 First, each is ad hoc, 279
and ICTR also generate legal dangers and difficulties.
formed for a particular purpose whose fulfillment may warrant veering from the
course of simple justice. The United Nations Security Council established the
ICTY for example, in response to a finding of widespread and severe human
rights abuses during the bloody disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. 280 The
Security Council directly stated that an intended purpose, in addition to that of
dispensing justice, was to contribute to "the restoration and maintenance of
peace. ' '2Si Other moral and political purposes may also have entered into the

genesis of the ICTY to deflect a sense that the West, in particular Germany's early recognition of
Slovenia and Croatia, had all but assured the anarchic, bloody break-up of Yugoslavia. See Misha
Glenny, Germany Fans the Flames of War NEW STATESMAN, Dec. 20, 1991, at 14. Further:
Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia will definitely mean war in Bosnia and probably in
Macedonia unless asubstantial UN peace-keeping force is put in place before it happens.
At the moment, the chances of that happening appear slim
The struggle in Bosnia
would be unspeakably bloody.
Id.At the time he wrote, Glenny was BBC's Central Europe correspondent. See also SUSAN L.
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY- CHAOS AND DISILLUSION AFTER THE COLD WAR

147 (1995) (arguing

that the Western powers, by allowing the Yugoslav crisis to be defined along ethnic lines, inadvertently
"undermined or ignored the forces that opposed the radical nationalists and indirectly contributed to the
filfillment of the best dreams of the national extremists."). See generally Bette Denich, Unmaking
Multi-Ethnicity in Yugoslavia: Metamorphosis Observed, Anthropology of East Europe Review

Autumn, 1993, available at http://condor.depaul.edu/-rrotenbe/aeer/aeerl Il/denich.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2004) (noting the long-term growth of inter-ethnic alienation and distrust also helped to cause
Yugoslavia's disintegration).
277 Scharf, supra note 244, at 178-96.
278. See Unocal III, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 27 (Reinhardt, J., concurring):
The [ICTY] was formed with the limited mandate of adjudicating allegations of human
rights abuses that took place in the Balkans in the last decade. Established by Security
Council Resolution 827 in May, 1993, it is atemporary body whose members are elected
for four-year terms by the members of the United Nations General Assembly. The
[ICTRI
is a similarly-constituted body.
Id

279. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (7th ed. 1999).
280. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 2. The ICTY was established pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 808, adopted February 22, 1993, and Secunty Council Resolution 827, adopted May 25,
1993. See U.N. Doc. S/RES/808(1993); U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). The finding regarding
widespread human rights abuses in Yugoslavia was established by an independent commission, formed
pursuant to an earlier UN Security Council resolution.
281. Tadic 1997 supra note 184, at 2. Another authoritative voice, UN Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs, Carl August Fleischhauer, stated the ICTY had three main goals: "ending war crimes,
bringing the perpetrators to justice and breaking an endless cycle of ethnic violence and retribution.
See Scharf & Epps, supra note 270, at 660. The Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine
Albnght, stated the primary purpose of the tribunal should be to "establish the historical record before
the guilty can reinvent the truth. Id.
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formation of the tribunal,282 and there are ongoing concerns over its political
independence.283 This politicization is problematic, and should weaken confidence
in the impartiality of the "work product" of the ICTY including the legal standards

it established for itself. In the tribunals' place, international law in general - "the"
international law, so to speak - should draw its norms and standards from
permanent, democratically accountable legal regimes, in which the dispensation of
justice is the overarching and dominant purpose. 2u

282. See YvEs BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
171 (1999) (writing that establishment of the ICTY was "substitute for an effective, timely, military
intervention [during the Bosnian cnsis] by the UN Security Council."); Aleksa Djilas, The Politicized
Tribunal,
IWPR
TRIBUNAL
UPDATE,
July
25,
2001,
available
at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2001/0725icty.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004)
(inferring from its indictments and other practices, that the tribunal's purposes include punishing
NATO's enemies and rewarding its friends); David Binder, The Ironic Justice of Kosovo, MSNBC
(US),
March
17, 2000, available at http://www.geocities.conr/cpa~blacktown/20000319
balkamsnus.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004) (Binder, a New York Times correspondent for the Balkans
since 1963, stated, that "[p]ortraying the Serbs as [the ongin of evil in the Balkans] is an unwritten
doctrine adopted by the State Department at the beginning of the Yugoslav conflicts and continued
today, doctrine endorsed and spread by the mainstream media, human rights groups and even some
religious communities.").
283. See, e.g, Jamie Shea, Press Conference Given by Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesperson, and
Major General Walter Jertz, SHAPE Spokesperson (May 16, 1999), available at http://
www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990516b.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). Shea, in response to question
regarding ICTY jurisdiction over NATO actions in Kosovo, stated:
I think we have to distinguish between the theoretical and the practical. I believe that
when [Chief Prosecutor] Justice Arbour starts her investigation [into the events in
Kosovo], she will because we will allow her to. It's not Milosevic that has allowed
Justice Arbour her visa to go to Kosovo to carry out her investigations. If her court, as
we want, is to be allowed access, it will be because of NATO.
Id., John Laughland, This Is Not Justice, THE GUARDIAN (UK), February 16, 2002, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4357313,00.html
(last visited Mar. 10, 2004)
(stating that by refusing to investigate NATO attacks on Yugoslavia, "the strict circumscription of the
circumstances under which war may be waged (ius ad bellum) has now been replaced by an infinitely
malleable series of double-standards about how it may be waged (ius in bello): on Jamie Shea's own
admission in 1999, these standards are deployed in the service of the Hague's pay-masters, the Nato
states."). Similarly, others have noted that:
Although the Yugoslavia Tribunal is designed to be independent from the Security
Council, one cannot ignore the facts that the Security Council selected the Tribunal's
prosecutor and proposed a short list of judges from which the General Assembly chose.
Indeed, given that the battle for control of Bosnia was in large measure a religious war
between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs, it is astonishing that four of the eleven
judges elected by the General Assembly upon the nomination of the Council come from
states with predominantly Muslim populations.
Michael Scharf & Epps, supra note 270, at 645; Cogan, supra note 273, at 119 ("in model domestic
judicial systems,
the right to prepare a defense, equality of arms, and judicial independence
are
all more or less taken for granted.
[Iln international criminal courts at present, such an assumption
would be unwarranted.").
284. Regarding democratic accountability, see Cogan, supra note 273, at 114. Cogan lamented the
absence in international tribunals "of strong community of 'watchdog' observers for fair trial
proceedings. Id. He concluded that "the realm of international criminal justice is distinguished from
domestic criminal justice not simply because accountability [for crimes of such an extreme nature] and
sovereignty [in pursuit of, for example, national security objectives] weigh heavier in this context, but
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The third-party liability standard might be where the ICTY is most tempted to
be partial. After all, the success or failure of the ad hoc tribunal has from the start
been widely seen to involve convicting certain national leaders with "command
responsibility" for human nghts violations in the former Yugoslavia. 285 Therefore,
there has always been present a temptation to create a third-party liability standard
that is as helpful as possible to tribunal prosecutors. If the tribunal has given in to
that temptation, then its third-party liability standard is exceptionally likely to be
unique, and out of line both with "normal" international law and standards of
liability in the world's domestic legal systems.
The Tadic appeals chamber decision may be an example of an ICTY
predisposition regarding third-party liability matters. The trial chamber majority
had dismissed certain charges because Serbia had not exercised effective control
over the Bosnian Serb forces.286 In a sharp dissenting opinion, Judge Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald argued for a much lower threshold to find an individual a de facto
agent of a foreign government.287 ICTY ally Scharf agreed, urgently pointing out
the damage a high threshold might do to the future case against the ICTY's
ultimate quarry- "the ruling may effectively lift the responsibility for atrocities
committed during most of the three and a half year-long conflict [in Bosnia] from
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic." 288 The Tadic appeals court reversed that
aspect of the trial chamber decision.28 9
In sum, it is deeply troubling, in light of the specialized nature of the ICTY
the indications of bias (in particular, for Doe v. Unocal, regarding command
responsibility matters), and the restricted "case law" upon which the tribunal
draws, to find that federal courts are "increasingly turning to the decisions by
international criminal tribunals for instructions regarding the standards of
international human rights law under our civil ATCA. 29 Moreover, the ICTY
third-party liability standard simply is not the "world standard, as common sense
would understand that phrase.
also because of the absence of an effective counterweight to check these interests. Id.
285. The frame of mind was evident in the run-up to the Tribunal's creation. Julia Preston, U.N.
Creates Tribunal to Try War Crimes in Yugoslav Warfare, WASH. POST, at 3, Feb. 23, 1993, available
at http://www-tech.mit.edu/Vi 13/N8/tribunal.08w.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004). "Last fall,
Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger singled out a number of top Serb politicians and military
figures - including Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his powerful patron in neighboring
Serbia, President Slobodan Milosevic - as ultimately responsible for war crimes committed by their
underlings.
Id. The following comment by
prominent human rights lawyer on the Slobodan
Milosevic trial also indicated ICTY insiders' frame of mind: "the whole point of this trial is to show
that those who are primarily responsible, who set the ball rolling, can be reached, and not just the foot
soldiers who commit the atrocities and bury the bodies. Geoffrey Robertson, quoted in CNN Intl.,
Q&A Late Afternoon: Slobodan Milosevic Takes Offensive (February 15, 2002), available at 2002 WL
5129332. For Robertson's insider credentials, see Marlise Simons, Milosevic Trial Settles Into Slov
But Judicious Routine, N.Y TiMES, March 3, 2003, at 4 (reporting that Robertson had been selected "to
head the new special court for war crimes in Sierra Leone.").
286. Tadic 1997, supra note 184, at 605.
287 Id.at 607 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
288. Scharf, supra note 244, at 196.
289. Tadic 1999, supra note 184,
156-62.
290. Unocal 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 12.
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C. Instead, a PaqueteHabanaApproach
The Unocal III error is an inability to discover a third-party liability standard
which has grown, "by the general assent of nations, into a settled rule of
international law ,291 But how should a court go about discovering such rules for
matters, such as third-party complicity with a regime's internal human rights
violations, which only after Nuremberg became firmly categorized as "traditional"
international law" 292
How are U.S. courts to avoid imposing their own
"idiosyncratic legal rules" upon other countries, in a pretense of applying
international law9 2 93 On the other hand, federal courts also must resist being
compelled to adopt, from "an amorphous entity - i.e., the 'law of nations' standards of liability applicable in concrete situations. ' 294 Courts need to find
tangible sources of law - and not the ad hoc law formed to deal with extraordinary
evil - in order to determine the present-day international law.
In pursuit of the concrete, courts should look to the 1900 Supreme Court case,
The Paquete Habana.295 The case, which concerned a matter of traditional
international law, a belligerent's seizure of coastal fishing vessels as "prize,
demonstrated the modem, positivist method for determining customary
international law rules. 296 The court stated that in order to ascertain and administer
customary international law,
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators who
by years of labor, research, and expenence have made themselves peculiarly well
acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by
judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concernimf
what the law
29
ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
The decision presented a lengthy historical review, based on primary sources,
of actual state practices. 29s The review started with the early 15th Century and
proceeded up to the contemporary practice of the "civilized nations. ' 29 Next,

291. Habana, 175 U.S. at694.
292. See Louis B. Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982) (stating that pnor to Nuremberg individual citizens (and
their rights) were the concern of domestic law alone; "apart from a few anomalous cases
[they] were
not subjects of rights and duties under international law"); Makau Mutua, From Nuremberg to the
Rwanda Tribunal: Justice or Retribution? 6 BUFF HUM. RTS. L. REV 77 82 (2000) (noting that
Nuremberg provided a foundation for the "international crimmalization of internal atrocities, despite
its subordination ofjustice to politics).
293. See Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881.
294. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring).
295. See generallyHabana, 175 U.S. 677 (demanding determination of the customary international
law standard for the treatment of local fishing vessels by wamng parties).
296. Id. at 678-79.
297 Id.
at 700.
298. Id.at 686-700.
299. The court understood the "civilized nations" to be the European powers and the United States,
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secondary sources were surveyed, allowing the court to peruse the opinions of
leading jurists, "witnesses of the sentiments and usages of civilized nations. ' 3°
The goal of the reviews of the primary and secondary sources was to determine
whether a legal rule had gathered the "general assent of civilized nations. That
requirement "is a stringent one, the Filartigacourt would later write.30'
After the Nuremberg expansion of international law to internal matters
previously not subjects of international law, internal judicial practice must be given
prominence in deciding international standards, where, as will increasingly be the
case, it is the most representative state practice available. This would be less an
innovation than a change in the valuation of domestic law vis-a-vis the law of
international tribunals and courts. As Habana indicated, for example, courts have
long relied on nation states' domestic laws as one form of evidence for customary
international law norms. 30 2 In fact, the Habanacase does so itself, citing domestic
laws regarding cross-border maritime matters. 0 3 Filartiga provides another
example, finding it important that "torture is prohibited, either expressly or
implicitly, by the constitutions of over fifty-five nations, including
the United
States. '' ~ For Doe v. Unocal, therefore, an approach in line with Habana might
examine the world's domestic legal systems for their treatment of third-party tort
liability and its near equivalents.30 5
Support for giving higher priority to the standards of domestic legal systems
is also found by looking again at standard materials on the sources of customary
international law. Fundamental in determining customary international law,
according to the Restatement on Foreign Relations Law, is the "general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation. 30 6
The Statute of the International Court of Justice (I0), "generally regarded as a
complete statement of the sources of international law, declares them to be the
30 7
following:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
along with the recent addition of "the Empire of Japan
the last state admitted into the rank of
civilized nations. Id. at 700. The court also implicitly brought Argentina into the civilized circle
through its references to the eminent Argentine jurist Calvo. Id. at 703.
300. Id. at 701.
301. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881.
302. See Habana, 175 U.S. at 689.
303. See id. (referring to French ordinance regarding capture of fishing vessels); idat 691 (citing
French legal order releasing English fishermen), and id at 694 (discussing a decision by an English
court). See also M. Erin Kelly, Customary International Law in United States Courts, 32 VILL. L. REV.
1089, 1122 (1987) (stating that "courts may look to the domestic laws of the United States and other
states as evidence of a norm").
304. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889 n.13.
305. The Unocal III concurrence took a very brief look at the standards of three "national legal
systems" and from this concluded that "[tihe status of joint liability as a general principle of law is
supported
by the fact that it is fundamental to 'major legal systems."' Unocal I11, 2002 U.S. App.
LEXIS 19263, at 30 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
306. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
307 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (5th ed. 1998).
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b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; [and]
d.
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of
30 8
law.

While the ICJ provision explicitly places judicial decisions in a subordinate
position to the practices and customs of nations, judicial decisions may be given
greater weight if they are helpful in determining the state practice. 309 "Case law,
ranked as subsidiary in subsection (d), nevertheless may reflect the meaning of an
ambiguous treaty provision
as evidence of the subsequent practice of states. 310
Further guidance on whether conduct has attained the status of customary
international law is offered in the following description of characteristics that acts
"obligatory under or consistent with international law" are required to possess: "(1 )
'concordant practice' by a number of states relating to a particular situation; (2)
continuation of that practice over 'a considerable period of time'- (3) a conception
that the practice is required by or consistent with international law; and (4) general
acquiescence in that practice by other states.",31
The first two of these
requirements are better met, in a positivist conception of international law, by legal
rules and standards that are widely shared among the world's domestic legal
systems, rather than by the rules and standards of ad hoc international criminal
tribunals.
V CONCLUSION

ATCA represents, both originally and in the present day, a commitment by
the United States to bring aliens' customary international law concerns into the
federal courts. 312 Our federal courts should carry forward our country's early vow
to be receptive to authentic "law of nations" alien tort claims, which today are
often international human rights lawsuits. However, the greatest advocates of
ATCA as a vehicle for such human rights claims may actually threaten the statute,
when they attempt to use ATCA to attack wrongs, such as the softer shades of
third-party complicity, which a world consensus has not decided are in violation of
customary international law If courts allow expansion of international law not

308. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 8, at 1055.

309. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987). An example of the
appropriate use of subsection (d) source is provided in David L. Nersessian, The Contours of
Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudencefrom the InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L

L.J. 231, 238 (2002) ("Case law, ranked as subsidiary in subsection (d), nevertheless may reflect the
meaning of an ambiguous treaty provision
as evidence of the subsequent practice of states.").
310. Nersessian, supra note 309, at 238.
311. Henry J. Steiner, et al., Transnational Legal Problems, 240 (4th ed. 1994) (citing Working
Paper by Manley 0. Hudson, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 26 U.N. Doe. A/CN 4/16 (1950).
312. Unoca 111, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at 8.
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based on consensus, and refuse it the guidance of actual, permanent legal regimes,
they are breaking with the positivist legal tradition. In this light, perhaps the
Unocal III judges were misguided by US. v. Smith, an 1820 Supreme Court
decision which stated that the law of nations "may be ascertained by consulting the
works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and
practice of nations; or by judicialdecisions recognizing and enforcing that law"313
Smith does not give state practice greater weight than the learned writings of
academics and other jurists; in fact, the jurists are mentioned first. 314 This is
classic natural law advice and should
be looked on skeptically by those wary of the
"new" customary international law. 315
Doe v. Unocal should avoid the methodology of natural law and instead
discover the consensus practice within the world's legal systems regarding
domestic aiding and abetting tort violations. Gathering many legal systems' rules
together, one would likely find the most stnngent third-party liability standards
nearly universally create tort liability, while progressively more relaxed complicity
rules are less and less the object of consensus. Perhaps the more stringent
complicity standard of Unocal II would be found near universal in domestic
practice among nations, and the modified ICTY standard adopted by Unocal III far
from universal. In fact, while the ICTY standard is similar to some U.S. domestic
common law third-party tort liability standards, it is certainly not the consensus
even in the United States, as the Unocal H decision makes clear.3i 6 Thus, while it
was and is morally wrong for the Unocal Corporation to knowingly or
constructively be a party to an increase in the brutal human rights violations
perpetrated by the Burmese military, Unocal's complicity with human rights
violations would likely not reach a consensus customary international law. standard
derived from domestic legal systems' practice. In sum, although a Paquete
Habanaapproach might vanquish the Doe v. Unocalplaintiffs, ATCA itself would
remain alive as a vehicle for attacking violations of customary international human
rights law if those wrongs violate the laws and standards of the world's legal

313. Unocal 111,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263, at II (quoting Filartiga,630 F.2d at 880 and
Untied States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820)) (emphasis added by the Unocal Ill

court).
314. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 154,
315. See supra note 12. Justice Story wrote in 1822 of the law of nations connection to natural law:
"Every doctrine, that may be fairly deduced by correct reasoning from the rights and duties of nations,
and the nature of moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations. United
States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F Cas. 832, 846 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551), overruledon
other grounds, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). See also Jay, supra note 35, at 822 n. II (writing that at
the end of the Eighteenth Century "a consensus existed that the law of nations rested in large measure
on natural law. As Emmerich de Vattel contended, and Americans repeated, 'the law of Nations is
originally no other than the law of Nature applied to Nations."' Jay, supranote 35, at 822 n.I I (quoting
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS,

at Ivi(Joseph Chitty ed., 1863) (1758)). Moreover,

"[tihe law of nations has its foundation in the principles of natural law, applied to states; and in
voluntary institutions, arising from custom or convention. Jay, supra note 35, at 822 n. II (quoting
Charge to the Grand Jury for the District of Virginia 16 (May 23, 1791) (A. Davis ed. 1791), in 2 THE
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON

813 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967)).

3 i 6. See supra notes 134-52 and accompanying text.
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If Doe v. Unocal reaches the Supreme Court, however, conservative Supreme
Court justices would likely be more tempted by the "originalist" arguments of
Bork and Sweeney than by Habana. If the originalist view were to become
established law, international human rights actions under ATCA would come to an
end.31 8 That would not be the case if the court were to take the Habana approach,
which also contrasts with the originalist approach by being in accord with the
statute's literal meaning and original intent. All in all, Habana is a more attractive
option for the Court.
In any case, the legacy of Filartigais under threat. It is threatened by the
originalists, of course, but the circumscribed sense of customary international law
of Filartiga is also endangered by the new customary international law, a
descendant of the visionary remarks by Judge Wilson quoted at the outset of this
paper.3 19 Therefore, federal judges should resist such self-inflation and return to
the grounded positivism of The Paquete Habana. Federal judges need to reassure
those of us who do not want to take wing and fly with Judge Wilson that we do in
fact "live in a more positivist age, and that modern-day courts really do "feel less
comfortable 'creating' international law ,,320

317 Notjust among those The Paquete Habanaregarded as "civilized. Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
318. Both Bork and Sweeney would exclude all ATCA-based human rights actions. See Tel-Oren,
726 F.2d at 813 (Bork, J., concurring); Sweeney, supra notes 98 and 105. See generally sub-section
III.C
and accompanying footnotes.
319. THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 282 (R. McCloskey ed., 1967).
320. Dodge I, supra note 3, at 253-54 (commenting on Judge Story's quotation in The La Jeune
Eugenie, 26 F Cas. at 846, reproduced, supra note 315).

